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Chapter one: Introduction and background 
 
1.1 Introduction 
For more than two decades Somalia has been haunted by civil war, becoming a 
byword for perpetual violence. Suffering from the absence of a permanent and 
effective government the country is regularly ranked as one of the most unstable areas 
in the world, and is found on the top of the list of failed states year after year (Fund for 
Peace 2012). The turmoil in Somalia has offered lucrative investment opportunities for 
Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). This thesis will discuss how the 
presence of PMSCs affect Somali security sector institutions. 
PMSCs acted in support roles for western armies in a series of international 
interventions in Somalia during the first half of the 1990s, after the fall of the regime 
in 1991. The current United Nations (UN) approved intervention, the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), also has PMSCs working under its umbrella. Some 
are financed by foreign governments, like the United States (US), to fight against the 
Islamist militia al-Shabab (New York Times 2011), while there is also a number of 
PMSCs providing static guard and escort services to Non Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), humanitarian organizations and other actors from the international 
community. But not only actors from the international community hire PMSCs. All 
three political entities within Somalia, namely Puntland, Somaliland and the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
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 in Mogadishu, have contracted PMSCs to 
build the capacities of their maritime security sector. 
It is argued that the presence of PMSCs in weak states can erode state power, 
diminish the monopoly on the state’s legitimate use of violence and prevent national 
institution building (Hansen 200:585; Østerud 2005:103). I want to analyze this 
argument by trying to find out how the presence of PMSCs affect the stabilization 
process in Somalia, and particularly how the companies affect security sector 
                                                        
1 The TFG has been in power in Somalia since 2004, but in August a new federal Parliament was 
convened swearing out the transitional administration. The transition towards a permanent government 
is ongoing, but as this thesis must refer to the situation as it was during the research period, the TFG is 
referred to as the internationally recognized authority of Somalia. 
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institution building. Much of the literature on the topic focuses on the negative sides of 
private contractors getting involved in weak states or areas of limited statehood, 
however, this study seeks to examine the extent and ways to which PMSCs in Somalia 
enable institution building in the Somali security sector. Three sub questions are 
examined: 
- To what extent does the UN see PMSCs as a contributor to stability? 
- What types of PMSCs are present in Somalia? 
- How do the locals perceive the PMSCs in Somalia?  
 
 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
This chapter offers an introduction to the issue of PMSCs and gives background 
information about Somalia. First a definition of PMSCs is given, proceeded by a 
section explaining the growth of PMSCs after the Cold War. A segment consisting of a 
brief summary of recent Somali history gives insight to the situation in the country and 
the chapter ends with some thoughts around labeling Somalia as a failed state. 
Chapter two explains the methodology applied. It goes through the use of 
sources and describes how interviews were planned and conducted, and also gives an 
account of safety issues that had to be taken into consideration. 
In chapter three the theoretical framework is accounted for. The main focus is 
on the theory of the state’s monopoly of legitimate use of violence, but other 
theoretical concepts are also discussed and included in the framework. 
Chapter four seeks to answer the first of the three sub questions examined in the 
thesis statement. This is achieved by giving an account of the arms embargo on 
Somalia and by examining UN policy regarding the use of PMSCs. 
Chapter five gives an account of the variety of PMSCs operating in Somalia. It 
shows that there is a difference in regard to what types of PMSCs are present in the 
different geographical areas, and that whether a private contractor is successful over 
time or not seems to depend on if it operates within the limits of the liberal peace 
paradigm. 
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Chapter six offers an impression of how PMSCs are perceived by Somalis. 
Based on interviews and literature review it also discusses issues concerning 
transparency and accountability. 
Finally chapter seven provides some concluding remarks and suggestions for 
further areas of reseach. 
 
 
1.3 Definition of Private Military and Security Companies 
PMSCs do not have a clear-cut definition. Different authors use different terms and 
this can cause confusion. «Mercenaries», «contractors», «private warriors», «corporate 
warriors», «private military firms» and «private security companies» are all frequently 
used in the media and the academic literature to cover the same phenomenon, and all 
these labels create rather different associations. The industry itself often resorts to 
somewhat inconspicuous labels such as «security management companies» and «risk 
mitigating companies», or alternatively, they avoid labels and simply describe their 
services (Østensen 2011:7). 
Some scholars distinguish between private security companies (PSCs), private 
military companies (PMCs) and private military firms (PMFs), but in reality many 
companies provide a wide range of services. One company’s services can vary from 
typical military services such as participating in combat, to other services related to 
more traditional security, such as providing static guards. In accordance with the 
definition in The Montreux document (ICRC 2009) this thesis uses the term private 
military and security companies with the initials PMSCs to denote all companies that 
provide either private or military services or both. If authors quoted in this thesis have 
used other acronyms for PMSCs, their typology has not been changed within the 
quotations. 
This thesis’ use of the term PMSCs cover companies that offer offensive and 
defensive services. The companies’ activities can range from logistic functions like 
catering, transport and other support functions to military training and front line 
combat (Østerud 2005:79). PMSCs are «corporate bodies that specialize in the 
provision of military skill. […] By the very fact of their function, they break down 
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what have long been seen as the traditional responsibilities of the government» (Singer 
2008:8). 
There are several ways of classifying the different types of PMSCs within the 
academic literature. The «Tip of the Spear» typology is a simple model for 
classification which is helpful in understanding the various actors’ activities. In this 
model the companies are divided into three types according to their range of services 
and level of force, and the «tip of the spear» symbolizes the front line. The first type, 
«military provider firms», conducts services at the front line. They can engage in the 
actual fighting as specialists or through command of forces. The second type, 
«military consulting firms», offers training and advisory services. The third type, 
«military support firm», provides supplementary military services like non-lethal aid 
and assistance. These supplements are for instance technical support, transportation, 
intelligence and logistics (Singer 2008:91-100).  
Christopher Kinsey argues that PMSCs can be classified along two axes: The 
means they use to secure their objective, ranging from lethal to non-lethal, and the 
object of their protection, ranging from private to public (Kinsey 2006:10).  
The companies described in the case study of this thesis span all three of 
Singer’s categories and are placed along both of Kinsey’s axes, ranging from direct 
involvement to consultancy and logistics. This thesis uses the blanket term PMSCs to 
describe all the companies, whatever they are doing, and then uses Singers «Tip of the 
Spear» typology to try to assess the effects of PMSCs on security sector institution 
building. 
 
What is meant by «institution building» 
Institutions are broadly defined as the formal and informal constraints that shape 
human interaction, and they can be social, economic, legal or political. (North 1990:3) 
Informal institutions include culture, norms and conventions backed by social custom. 
One example of such an informal constraint is the structure of family. Also, many 
economic and social interactions are based on informal norms of trust and reciprocity 
(Coyne & Leeson 2010:2-3). Examples of formal institutions are the police, military 
and court systems and political structures such as a parliamentary or presidential 
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system. Most societies have a mix of formal and informal institutions. «In providing 
the rules of the game, institutions provide incentives by influencing the costs and 
benefits associated with different activities. As such, institutions provide constraints 
on what can and cannot be achieved at any point in time» (ibid). 
This thesis’ focus regarding institution building is mainly placed on state 
entities with a role in ensuring the security for the state and its people. Thus it includes 
armed forces, entities with a responsibility of protecting the state’s territories, and 
actors that can play a role in the overseeing an implementation of security, such as 
ministries. 
 
Growth of Private Military and Security Companies  
After the Cold War there has been a tremendous growth in the private security 
industry. PMSCs have increasingly been replacing or supplementing national military 
and security personnel in conflict areas. «Military downsizing led to a flood of 
experienced personnel available for contracting» (Avant 2005:31). According to Peter 
Lock history shows that it is often the case that the downsizing of militaries, for 
whatever reason, leads to a rise in private military activity as skilled personnel look for 
places to sell their talents (1999:11).  
While there was an increase in the supply of skilled personnel on the private 
market after the Cold War there was a simultaneous increase in the demand for 
military skills. With the end of the Cold War «global threats became more varied, 
more capable, and more dangerous, while the traditional responses to insecurity and 
conflict were at their weakest. This transformation fed into a larger phenomenon of 
state collapse and resulted in new areas of instability» (Singer 2008:49). Some 
countries were seeking to upgrade and westernize their militaries as a way of 
demonstrating qualification for entry into western institutions, rulers of weak or failing 
states who were no longer propped up by superpowers needed assistance, and non-
state actors such as private firms, NGOs, and groups of citizens in the territories of 
weak or failing states requested professional aid (Avant 2005:31). 
Western governments have turned to private actors as a result of rising costs of 
national standing armies, professional training and armaments research 
 6 
and development (Krahmann 2002).  The revolution in military affairs is seen as a 
driving force to the increasing privatization of the military: The requirements and need 
for specialized personnel has boosted because of the development of high-technology 
warfare, close cooperation between the industry and the military is essential, and 
expertise must often be hire from private contractors (Østerud 2005:91). 
The development towards a privatized military can also be seen in a historically 
more philosophical perspective. The French Revolution marked the start of the rise of 
national state armies, and for the last few hundred years war, and thus the armies’ 
soldiers, has been identified with the pursuit of national interest (Kinsey 2006:43). It 
was starting from this period of time that the loss of a soldier was regarded as a loss 
for the entire nation. «The armed forces were regarded, not as a part of the royal 
household, but as the embodiment of the Nation» (Howard 1976:110). With the 
growth of PMSCs, however, we might be witnessing somewhat of a shift from state 
armies in the sense that modern warfare is more instrumental and is «determined 
almost entirely by what it takes to kill members of the opposing side» (Coker 
2002:59).  If military security and warfare is no longer seen as a way of confirming 
national identity, but is considered an expense just like other expenses, it may be 
outsourced. According to Mark Malan the «Somalia effect», named after a failed 
operation where 18 US soldiers were killed in Mogadishu in 1993, was a turning point 
after which there has been a reluctance from western states of risking the lives of their 
national military’s soldiers in weak states’ inner problems (1999:42). The effort to 
capture the warlord Mohamed Farrah Aideed went terribly wrong for the US troops 
when two helicopters were shot down in Somalia’s capital, and when newspapers 
printed pictures of militia dragging the soldiers’ mutilated corpses through the streets, 
the news of the humiliating defeat spread around the world (Bowden 1999). The 
failed operation put heavy pressure on President Clinton and it was claimed that it 
made him look disinterested in the welfare of US soldiers (ibid:311). Engagement of 
western national militaries in weak states may lead to unpopular losses, and possibly 
cost governments their powers since citizens can punish parties in power with defeat in 
the next election (Doyle 1997:280). Hence there is an incentive for the governments to 
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find means of using force without losing political support, and this is where the 
PMSCs can offer a solution. 
 
1.4 From independence to state collapse  
The failed operation in Mogadishu in 1993 mentioned above is often referred to as the 
«First Battle of Mogadishu» or «Black hawk down» and is probably the single most 
famous event in the history of Somalia thanks to the book and subsequent movie about 
the incident. This event marked the beginning of the end of UNOSOM II, which was 
the third in a series of international interventions after Somalia’s central government 
collapsed. The country was left in a state of anarchy that has reigned ever since, but 
there was a history of violence in Somalia long before the collapse of the state (Harper 
2012:51-56). However, not all of Somalia is as war-torn as one might get the 
impression of. «Many Somalis, aid workers, diplomats, academics and others [have] 
mentally divided the territory into three, referring to it as the separate units of ‘south-
central’, Puntland and Somaliland, even if they officially recognized it as a single 
country» (ibid:3). The separation will also be made in this thesis as it is fruitful to 
follow the classification because the security situation differs much between the three 
territories, and accordingly there is a difference between the types of PMSCs hired in 
the different parts of Somalia and in the regions’ overall need of resolving to private 
contractors. 
 
The Republic of Somalia – 1960-1969 
The Republic of Somalia was formed in 1960 by joining the former colonies of British 
Somalia, which is todays Somaliland, and Italian Somalia, which consisted of what is 
today Puntland plus south and central Somalia (Le Monde diplomatique 2010). The 
Republic was modeled after western democracies with a prime minister, a National 
Assembly, and an elite bureaucracy. However, unlike western democracies, in Somalia 
division into clans and subgroups within clans are a fundamental aspect of life and the 
interaction between Somalis (Coyne & Leeson 2010:4). 
Since individuals identify primarily with their clans, there is no real Somali 
national identity, according to Coyne and Leeson, and as a consequence there was no 
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support for the formal institutions established at the time of independence in 1960 
(ibid). The result was a fragile political system where various factions sought power to 
benefit their narrow group, ultimately leading to the assassination of President 
Abdirashid Ali Shermarke in 1969 in what appeared to be an act of revenge linked to a 
clan dispute (Harper 2012:54). 
 
Muhammed Siad Barre’s regime 
Following the assassination of the president in 1969 General Muhammed Siad Barre 
seized power through a bloodless coup and was to stay in power for more than 20 
years. His regime has been referred to as the antithesis of western liberal democracy 
and was characterized by brutality against ordinary citizens and the absence of basic 
infrastructure and other goods and services that well-functioning governments provide 
(Coyne & Leeson 2010:5). Barre tried to eradicate the clan, one of the most 
fundamental elements of Somali society, by forbidding Somalis to refer to each other 
by their clan. Somalia were allies with the Soviet Union and North Korea, and «one of 
the key slogans for the new Somalia was ‘Tribalism divides, Socialism unites’» 
(Harper 2012:54). 
In 1977 Barre declared war against neighboring Ethiopia with the aim of 
capturing the Ogaden and establishing a Greater Somalia, but was defeated when the 
Soviet Union abandoned Somalia and instead started to supply Ethiopia. Devastation 
caused by losing the war led to a growing rebellion against the regime. As the political 
and economic situation further deteriorated clan based rebel groups intending to 
overthrow the regime mushroomed (ibid:55). By the 1980s a number of rebel 
movements had formed in opposition to Siad Barre’s regime all over the country. The 
Somali National Movement (SNM), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and the 
United Somali Congress (USC) established themselves, and in August 1990 SNM, 
SPM and USC met in Ethiopia and agreed to form a united front against Siad Barre. 
«By this time, in a situation strikingly similar to that of twenty years later, the central 
government’s control did not extend much further than the capital city» (ibid:56). The 
regime ultimately collapsed in January 1991. 
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State collapse and international interventions 
The fall of Siad Barre did not lead to the end of the civil war. Shortly after the fall of 
the regime, it became clear that the various rebel groups failed agreeing, and thus 
turned against each other. The government crumbled and «since 1990 the majority of 
Somalis have lived without any effective central leadership» (ibid:57). 
The international community viewed the collapse of the regime as problematic 
because it left Somalia in a state of perpetual violence. Civil war combined with 
drought led to the UN Security Council authorizing the United Nations Operation in 
Somalia (UNOSOM) in April 1992 – the first in a series of peacekeeping and famine 
relief operations. It was a relatively small operation, and when it proved to lack the 
necessary persuasive power, a new American-led force known as the Unified Task 
Force (UNITAF) was launched in December the same year under the optimistic title 
«Operation Restore Hope». For the first time in its history the Security Council 
approved unilateral UN intervention with the use of offensive military force in a 
sovereign state.  The operation had some initial success in ensuring aid convoys, but 
neither the UN nor the US fully understood the complexity on the ground and things 
started to go badly for the operation, which by March 1993 had become the largest UN 
operation in the world known as UNOSOM II. Somali factions rejected armed foreign 
peacekeepers’ presence, and the conflict reached its most critical point in the «First 
Battle of Mogadishu» after which president Clinton ordered the American troops 
home. Western contingents were replaced by third world troops for the last stage of the 
operation and its eventual disbandment in March 1995 (Lewis 2008:78-81; Harper 
2012:60-61). 
 
 
1.5 Viable institutions within Somalia 
The departure of the UN forces led to years of international neglect of Somalia. 
Foreign powers have sponsored conventions aiming at ending the various conflicts that 
arose after the collapse of the state ever since the fall of Siad Barre, but despite 
numerous national reconciliation conferences and other attempts to revive and 
reestablish a central government, the country is still in lack of a central state and 
institutions and is portrayed as the world’s most comprehensively failed state 
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(Menkhaus 2004:8; Harper 2012:8, 199). The various meetings and conferences have 
produced a succession of weak transitional governments, all of which have not so far 
resulted in ending the conflicts or establishing satisfactory structures. «These 
governments have controlled limited parts of the country; their authority has 
sometimes extended to no more than a few blocks of the capital, Mogadishu» (Harper 
2012:199). 
Robert Jackson makes the distinction between positive and negative sovereignty 
and refers to quasi-states, a concept created to describe some ex-colonial states. 
Negative sovereignty is defined as the freedom from outside interference, meaning it’s 
a formal-legal condition. But even though a country enjoys juridical statehood, it can 
lack the institutional features of sovereign states as defined by classical international 
law – they have limited empirical statehood or positive sovereignty (Jackson 1990). 
Positive sovereignty is where governments possess the ability to provide political 
goods for its citizens and exercise effective dominion over its people (ibid). Somalia 
undoubtedly has a lack of positive sovereignty and one can argue that the country is a 
quasi-state, or indeed a failed state. 
The TFG was in power in south-central Somalia from 2004 until August 2012, 
and was thus still in power during the research for this thesis. Due to the instability in 
the region, south-central Somalia, and mainly Mogadishu, is where most of the 
PMSCs are located. There is a large number of security related private contractors in 
and around the capital. Even though the TFG was the international recognized 
government of Somalia, its de facto control over Somali territories has greatly varied 
over the years since it was formed. «Somalia’s frail Transitional Federal Government 
has struggled ineffectually to contain a complex insurgency that conflates religious 
extremism, political and financial opportunism, and clan interests» (UN Security 
Council 2010:6). 
But it is not accurate to characterize all parts of Somalia as a failed state. 
Menkhaus points out that «far from sinking into complete anarchy, Somalia has seen 
the rise of sub-state polities, some of which have assumed a fragile but nevertheless 
impressive capacity to provide core functions of government» (2004:11). In the 
northwest the SNM was strengthening its position throughout the region when the 
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state collapsed, and after breaking away from Somalia in May 1991 Somaliland 
loosened itself from outside interference. The people of Somaliland have built a 
system that was initially based on clan politics and respect for elders, but over time has 
incorporated more modern political institutions and processes. «Somaliland is in many 
ways the strongest political entity within the internationally recognised borders of 
Somalia» (Hansen 2008:594). Since Somaliland itself is not internationally recognized 
as a sovereign country the government has its limitation, however, some label it one of 
the most stable polities in the Horn of Africa with democratic credentials to rival any 
country in the region and most Muslim states  (Lewis 2008:72-76; Harper 2012:123-
126). 
The neighboring northeastern region of Puntland is another area of relative 
stability. Puntland has had its own president, government and regional administration 
since 1998, but instead of following the example of Somaliland by declaring itself 
independent, it operates as a sort of «mini-state» within Somalia. Through its short 
history as a semi-autonomous region Puntland has experienced a number of political 
upheavals, and for years it served as a stronghold for piracy (Harper 2012:109). The 
situation in Puntland is thus not as stable as in Somaliland, but it is far from as volatile 
as the condition in south-central Somalia.  
Some claim that the concept of a failed state is dangerously limiting, because 
the choice Somalia faces is not between its current state and the type of liberal 
democracy that exists in the developed western world. Coyne and Leeson (2010:5) 
argue that the government collapsed not because it was poorly designed, but because 
existing informal institutions were at odds with the formal institutions that were 
imposed, with dysfunction being the result. International interventions that have 
attempted to establish new formal institutions with a central government have failed 
for the same reason, which is probably a good thing, according to Coyne and Leeson, 
because if another functioning central government was established it is probable that it 
would resemble the Barre regime. In many weak or failed states the absence of such a 
predatory central government may be preferable to the existence of any form of central 
government, and thus Coyne and Leeson concludes that anarchy in Somalia is a 
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constrained optimum given that ideal political institutions are not within Somalia’s 
feasible institutional opportunity set (2010:5-6). 
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Chapter two: Methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The scope of this study suggests a descriptive research method. The thesis sets out to 
get an overview of the range of PMSCs working in Somalia, see how they affect local 
institutions and get an impression of how the public perceives the PMSCs. The 
exploratory method is considered suitable because the study of PMSCs is marked by 
uncertainty and a lack of specific theories (Marshall & Rossman 1999:32-34). The 
research for the master thesis has primarily been conducted with qualitative methods 
through interviews and literature review. Qualitative methods are defined as 
fundamentally interpretive research tools used in a natural setting to understand a 
social phenomena holistically, and formed with words based on reporting detailed 
views of participants (Creswell 2003:181-183).  
Since I have not found statistic material related to PMSCs in Somalia that could 
initiate an interesting quantitative research method, I find the qualitative method best 
suited for my thesis. Quantitative studies are here understood as statistical analysis 
where the research is presented with numbers and the researcher interprets the pattern 
in the data material (Hellevik 1999:13). 
The research design for this thesis falls into the broad category termed case 
study. Yin defines a case study as «an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident» (2009:18). The case study is 
seen as having a distinct advantage when a «question is being asked about a 
contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no control» 
(ibid:13). This thesis should benefit from using case study as a research method 
because the hiring of PMSCs is a contemporary phenomenon and the actions related to 
it is out of my control. It might, however, be questioned to what degree companies 
have been studied within their real-life context. I went to Nairobi, Kenya, and to 
Hargeisa and Berbera in Somaliland to do interviews. Interviews were conducted with 
Somali businessmen, a Somali member of parliament, several UN sources, sources 
within the TFG and representatives of PMSCs. Two of the interviews were conducted 
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in Norway: The first with the head of Nordic Crisis Management, a security advisor 
firm that has been involved at the Berbera port for several years; the other with a 
source within the TFG that happened to be in Norway at the time. Because of the 
security situation in Mogadishu, where most of the PMSCs operate, I did not go there 
to observe PMSC employees in action. Consequently references of how PMSCs work 
in Somalias capital are obtained through interviewees and not by first hand 
observation. Due to the security situation I did not go to Puntland either. Safety issues 
are discussed more at length later in this chapter.  
 
 
2.2 Primary and secondary sources 
The academic field of PMSCs is constantly developing, and even though there is a 
growing selection of articles and books on the subject it is still relatively young. Much 
of the existing literature focuses on so-called private mercenaries’ history in Africa, 
but there is little to find specifically on Somalia, thus a literature review is not 
sufficient in a case study of Somalia.  
Good construct validity has been an objective through the to use of multiple 
sources of evidence (Yin 2009:40). Construct validity can be defined as a matter of 
«identifying correct operational measures for the concepts being studied» (ibid). In 
addition to choosing interviewees that have obtained knowledge about PMSCs 
working in Somalia, and interviewees that have knowledge about how the companies 
are perceived on the local level, I have relied on academic contributions, research 
papers, official UN-reports, and other publications such as journalistic work in the 
investigation. There are few academic sources that focus on PMSCs in Somalia 
specifically. The analysis is therefore to a great extent based on primary and secondary 
sources like documents and interviews.  
 
 
2.3 Interviews 
I conducted interviews in Nairobi, Kenya and in Hargeisa and Berbera, Somaliland 
during an approximately four week long trip in April and May 2012. Interviews were 
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found to be especially useful because the study is dealing with sensitive and 
controversial issues like privatization of military tasks and profit from war or war-like 
actions. I feel confident that the face-to-face meetings motivated the interviewees to 
answer fully and accurately. It is my clear impression that many of the interviews 
would have been impossible to conduct via telephone or email, and the fact that I 
made an effort to meet with the interviewees made it easier for them to trust me. Since 
the scope of the thesis opens for a descriptive and exploratory research, topical 
interviewing was chosen as method. This form of interview is structured towards the 
aim of piecing together from different people a «coherent narrative that explains 
puzzling outcomes» (Rubin & Rubin 1995:196). The puzzle in this thesis is to 
examine the extent and ways to which PMSCs in Somalia can enable security sector 
institution building, more specifically by studying what types of PMSCs are operating 
in Somalia, describing how the PMSCs’ services are seen as a contributor to stability, 
and getting an impression of how the public perceives the PMSCs. Since the topic was 
clearly defined, I met the interviewees with a set of specific questions – a so-called 
interview guide (ibid:197). The guide was formed as a checklist of the main topics, 
and the list of questions was structured in an order that seemed suitable for promoting 
a productive discussion. Open-ended questions were preferred because they can 
assume a conversational manner and the researcher «can ask key respondents the facts 
of a matter as well as for the respondents’ opinion about events » (Yin 1994:84). I also 
tried to prepare questions that opened for relevant follow-up questions on the spot. If 
the interviewees drifted away from the main topics, as could happen, the interview 
guide was used to steer them back on track (Rubin & Rubin 1995:208). 
The presence of PMSCs in Somalia is seen as a controversial issue. I adjusted to 
this by not asking questions that could be perceived as provocative or that was 
sensitive to the interviewees until late in the interviews. It was important to avoid a 
deadlock early in the process (ibid:197-208). Topical interviews can be categorized as 
a mix between a formal and an informal research approach. I think «semi structured» 
is a good description of these type of interviews. The interviews were informal enough 
to open for personally adjusted follow-up questions, but they also had traits of 
formality through the interview guide with the predetermined topics (Marshall & 
 16 
Rossman 1999:108). 
Most of the interviewees could speak English, but for the few interviews where 
the interviewees did not speak English an interpreter assisted in translating. There is 
no doubt that some information is lost through the process of translation, but I used the 
same interpreter throughout the stay in Nairobi, and we talked about the topic of the 
thesis and how we could ensure that the interviews were translated as good as possible. 
While I was in Somaliland I had no use for an interpreter. I did have a fixer who 
helped me with attaining a visa and with various other practical issues, but she did not 
assist in getting interviews for the thesis. In Nairobi the interpreter also functioned as a 
fixer, and it was through him I got in touch with most of the Somalis interviewed for 
the thesis. I made it clear to the fixer that I wanted to meet Somalis with different 
perspectives on the role of PMSCs. He is Somali, knows the Somali diaspora in 
Nairobi and had connections in the TFG and in the Somali community. Without his 
help it is likely that getting interview appointments with the Somali interviewees 
would not have gone as smoothly as it did. I also experienced that it became 
increasingly easier to get appointments with relevant interviewees after I had been in 
Nairobi a few days and had met people in person and told them about my project. 
Although the interviewees’ specific knowledge about PMSCs varied, I believe the 
interviews have formed a solid basis for the analysis of the research question. 
 
Informed Consent 
All interviewees were informed that they were participants in a research project that 
would be published. Both for ethical and practical reasons it was important that they 
were aware of the nature of the project. Each interview started with me presenting the 
project and myself. In addition to making sure the interviewees were informed of what 
they were a part of, these short oral presentations were helpful for me to structure my 
thoughts and made me more aware of what I prioritized in the thesis. Informed consent 
is a ground rule in social science. The core of the concept is that all participants shall 
be informed of what might occur when the research is published. They must be able to 
comprehend this information and make rational judgments about it (Denscombe 
2010:67-69). All the interviewees were asked if they accepted that the interview was 
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recorded. Two interviewees refused to have the interviews recorded, thus it was 
important that good notes were taken during those interviews. The interviewees were 
all asked if they would mind if their names appeared in the thesis. Five out of fourteen 
interviewees wanted to be anonymous.  
 
 
2.4 Safety issues 
Somalia is regarded as one of the most hazardous countries on earth, Mogadishu one 
of the world’s most dangerous cities. One of my very first actions in Nairobi was to 
make contact with the Norwegian embassy, as it is the embassy in Kenya that also has 
responsibility of Norwegian interests in Somalia. I met with the counselor who deals 
with Somalia and informed him about my plans in Nairobi and asked for advice 
concerning the security situation in Somalia and Somaliland. The official travel advice 
for Somalia from the Norwegian authorities is that they discourage all travel or stay in 
south-central, and north-eastern Somalia and recommend Norwegians who are in those 
areas to leave immediately. For Somaliland all travel that is not strictly necessary is 
discouraged. I inquired about the possibility to go to the green zone at the airport in 
Mogadishu, where most of the PMSCs are located, but the embassy strongly advised 
me not to go to south-central Somalia. While I was in Kenya and Somaliland to do 
research, preparations were being done for the then upcoming election of parliament in 
Mogadishu. According to the Norwegian embassy the security threat was therefore 
higher at that time, and all international personnel were potential targets. 
Although it might have been perfectly safe at the Mogadishu airport compound, 
commonly referred to as the green zone, I decided to follow the security advice from 
the embassy and did not go. I recognize that it is certainly not ideal that I have not 
been able to witness the situation under which the PMSCs operate with my own eyes, 
but must thus rely on the observations of the interviewees. If I had gone to the green 
zone I would have had to buy security services from the companies I was there to 
interview and observe, and that would have posed new methodical and ethical 
questions. 
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Unfortunately I was not able to go to Puntland, also because of security 
concerns. Due to my lack of sources and practical knowledge about the Puntland 
region I concluded that it would not be worth the risk to go there. One PMSC 
operating in Puntland is discussed in this study. Information about the specific PMSC 
and the conditions in Puntland has been obtained through interviews with UN sources 
and Somali nationals in Nairobi and Somaliland. 
In Somaliland I had a fixer who helped me with practical issues before my 
arrival. The capital, Hargeisa, is relatively safe, so I did not need to hire security while 
I was there. However, on the route from Hargeisa to Berbera one can encounter 
robbers, and I was advised to hire a team from the Special Protection Unit (SPU) to 
escort me. SPU is not a private security company, but a part of the Somaliland police 
force partially trained by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and 
typically does security services for UN personnel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 19 
Chapter three: Theoretical framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of the theoretical framework is to form a platform for the analysis of the 
research question. The theory of the state’s monopoly of legitimate use of violence is 
the foundation of this analysis. But I have also found it natural to include the concept 
of accountability and transparency, liberal peace theory and agency theory in the 
theoretical framework. Collectively these concepts will open for a fruitful discussion 
regarding the role of PMSCs in Somalia. 
 
 
3.2 The state’s monopoly of violence 
The state’s monopoly of legitimate use of violence is an essential theory used in most 
of the literature concerning PMSCs, and it has been claimed that the privatization of 
warfare, and thereby the hiring of private contractors that started to blossom after the 
Cold War, can challenge the traditional role of the state (Matlary and Østerud 
2005:11-12; Singer 2008:7).  Krahmann states that «Social Contract theorists from 
Thomas Hobbes to Jean-Jaques Rousseau have argued that citizens give up their right 
to the private use of force other than in self-defence in return for protection by the 
state» (2010:11), but it is Max Weber’s definition of the state that is most commonly 
used as reference. According to Weber a state is fulfilling its core task if it maintains 
an exclusive «legitimate use of physical force» (1964:154). The foundation of the state 
may therefore be challenged when the absolute control of violence is starting to break 
down through the delegation of military tasks from the government to private actors 
(Singer 2008:18). But at numerous stages in history non-state actors have played key 
roles in state building, and from a broad historical view the state’s monopoly of both 
domestic and international force is an anomaly, according to Singer: «These 
organizations also had a tendency to become powers onto themselves […] and often 
grew superior in power to local political institutions, particularly in areas of weak 
governance» (2008:39). 
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Elke Krahmann suggests that we are witnessing a norm change when it comes 
to the state’s monopoly on violence, referring to western governments that not only 
tolerate, but also actively encourage the growing role of PMSCs both domestically and 
internationally. The proliferation of PMSCs on the international arena «concern to a 
large extent weak states and areas of limited statehood, which only have ineffective 
legislative and police authorities or armed forces» (Krahmann 2009:27). In 2008 17 
states signed the Montreux Document, which according to its initiators, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Swiss government, 
reaffirms the obligation on states to ensure that PMSCs operating in armed conflicts 
comply with international humanitarian and human rights law. But according to 
Krahmann the Montreux Document shows that states appear to be unwilling to reassert 
their monopoly on the legitimate use of collective force in international affairs as 
many western militaries have legitimized – and rely on – private contractors, and 
expect NGOs in conflict areas to hire PMSCs for their own safety: 
Since much of international humanitarian and human rights law has developed 
on the basis of the norm of the state monopoly on the legitimate use of armed 
force and the primacy of interstate wars, it only controls the private use of 
armed force in local conflicts or insecure regions in exceptional circumstances. 
As a result, the legal constraints which ensure the legitimacy of PSCs at the 
domestic level in Western democracies are missing from the international arena 
(Krahmann 2009:28) 
 
Although there seems to be a consensus among the academics that privatization 
of military and security can challenge the state and even erode state power, especially 
in so-called weak states, some say too narrow a vision of the state’s monopoly on 
violence risks becoming a hindrance, leaving only the option of seeing PMSCs as a 
definite erosion of the state (Abrahamsen 2011:8-9). Abrahamsen argues that some of 
the best analyses of PMSCs in Africa have shown how state actors have sometimes 
been able to draw on external private military support in order to strengthen their 
position and gain autonomy, and this demonstrates how important it is to resist «too 
easy a retreat to the safe and cosy language of condemnation» (2011:236). 
In light of the various views on PMSCs’ role in relation to the concept of the 
state’s monopoly on the use of force in the academic literature, it is relevant to see 
how this applies to Somalia. Somalia is a weak state, maybe the most extreme variant 
 21 
of the kind, and accordingly it is unnatural to compare its situation with the ideals of 
liberal democracies of the west. 20 years of civil war has set its marks, and one can 
argue that there actually is no state to erode by outsourcing security tasks that the state 
ideally should be responsible of providing. When talking about the state’s monopoly 
on the use of violence in Somalia, one is talking about the monopoly the state should 
have had, rather than the state’s actual power.  
 
 
3.3 Other theoretical concepts 
Closely related to the question of the state’s monopoly of violence is the issue of 
accountability and subsequent of transparency. If security tasks that are traditionally 
considered to be the responsibility of the state are taken over by private actors, 
accountability is shifted from parliaments to the companies’ shareholders. The 
accountability of violence against the public from state agencies, which wield force in 
the name of the collective, is ensured through representative bodies such as elected 
governments and parliaments. In contrast, private armed forces are controlled and 
accountable exclusively to their employers or shareholders (Krahmann 2009:3). 
The US’ extensive use of PMSCs in Afghanistan and Iraq have contributed to 
alienate the local populations and left an impression among locals that foreign 
perpetrators go free, according to the organization Human Rights First. Especially the 
Nisoor Square killings in September 2007, where the US private security contractor 
Blackwater Worldwide killed 17 and wounded 24 civilians in Baghdad’s Nisoor 
Square, gave PMSCs a bad reputation and revealed large gaps in relation to 
accountability. «It defies logic that a U.S. soldier who commits a crime abroad can be 
held accountable under U.S. law, but a private contractor who commits the same exact 
crime may not» (Human Rights First 2012). But this is not a problem only concerning 
PMSCs registered in the US. According to Krahmann there is a lack of suitable 
stipulations in international law that can be applied to the operations of PMSCs in 
areas of limited statehood, disarraying the relation to both accountability and 
legitimacy: «Instead of legal and political legitimacy, the private use of armed force in 
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international affairs thus gains its legitimacy primarily from practical reasoning» 
(Krahmann 2009:28). 
The term transparency is closely linked to accountability. Transparency is here 
simply understood as «the free flow of information within an organization and 
between the organization and its many stakeholders, including the public» (Bennis et 
al 2008:3). In regards to PMSCs it indicates the level of openness connected to the 
companies actions. Naturally security concerns will to some degree have to limit 
PMSCs transparency in some cases, but if companies operate with a low degree of 
transparency it can create suspicion. Secrecy in regard to sensitive information can 
make them vulnerable and create wariness as to if important information, or illegal 
activities, are kept from the public (ibid:5-6) 
Liberal peace theory, or democratic peace theory, supposes that pairs of 
democratic states are more successful in maintaining peaceful relations than pairs that 
include at least one non-democratic state, and democracies are more peaceful 
internally than other regime types (Hegre 2005:17). In regards to this thesis liberal 
peace theory is relevant in two aspects, the first being that is argued that international 
interventions in Somalia have tried to create peace by imposing formal institutions 
based on the type of liberal democracy that exists in the developed western world 
(Coyne & Leeson 2010). The second aspect is that in its attempt to democratize 
Somalia, western governments have increasingly been using PMSCs, because the loss 
of soldiers’ lives in other state’s inner problems can make political leaders unpopular, 
and citizens can punish parties in power in the next election (UN source no.1 2012 
[interview]; Doyle 1997:280) 
PMSCs operating in Somalia are contracted by the TFG, UN agencies or by 
private individuals or other groups. Regardless of who contracts the PMSC, a situation 
may occur where the company that is delegated power exploits its position – the 
PMSC, the agent, can act in conflict with the interests of the one who delegated the 
power, the principal. In political science this is referred to as the principal-agent 
problem, or agency theory. The agent may acquire hidden knowledge and information 
that can give benefits if the principal is not informed. Also, the agent can perform 
hidden actions because the principal normally is not capable of monitoring all the tasks 
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it has delegated. If there is little or no fear of sanctions, the agent may perform actions 
for its own gain in conflict with the interest of the principal. (Rasch 2000:67-81). 
Though this is not the main theory in this thesis, it is relevant to include it as a part of 
the theoretical framework as it can be linked to the question of accountability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
Chapter four: The UN’s view on PMSCs 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to answer the question of to what extent PMSCs are seen as a 
contributor to stability by the UN. To perform security tasks effectively and safely 
PMSCs need to import armored cars and other types of security equipment into the 
country. But since 1992 there has been a complete arms embargo on Somalia in order 
to prevent just anyone from importing weapons, ammunition and other gear. Through 
literature review and additional information acquired through interview, the chapter 
provides a picture of the UN’s policy concerning its own and others actors’ use of 
PMSCs.  
 
 
4.2 Arms embargo on Somalia 
There is a general and complete arms embargo on Somalia. The UN Security Council 
imposed the open-ended embargo in 1992 through resolution 733 (UN Security 
Council 1992). Since then there have been some modifications to the embargo, 
including in 2006 when the embargo was partially lifted in a resolution that authorized 
African Union member states to deploy a regional intervention force to protect the 
TFG and to arm and train the TFG security forces (UN Security Council 2006). This 
operation, known as AMISOM, was established to replace Ethiopian troops that had 
invaded Somalia at the invitation of the TFG to defeat the networks of Islamic courts 
which had taken over large parts of the country (Hull & Svenssson 2008:8). One year 
later, in 2007, the arms embargo was revised again, being limited to non-state actors 
(UN Security Council 2007). It allows the supply of weapons and military equipment 
intended solely for the purpose of helping develop the Somali security sector 
institutions through the regional intervention force – all other financing of arms 
acquisitions as well as the direct or indirect sale or supply of technical advice or 
military training is prohibited. Thus it is actually not possible for international PMSCs 
to provide armed or unarmed security personnel, protection, security advice or any 
military service in Somalia without direct authorization from the Sanctions Committee 
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(UN source no.1 2012 [interview]). Nevertheless there are numerous PMSCs working 
throughout Somalia, and far from all operate with authorization or exemption from the 
arms embargo. 
Since external assistance to Somali security sector institutions must follow the 
procedures stipulated in Security Council resolution 1772 (2007), the provision 
of such assistance, in the absence of authorization from the Committee, 
constitutes a violation of the general and complete arms embargo on Somalia 
imposed by Security Council resolution 733 (1992).  (UN Security Council 
2012) 
 
A UN source claims that the current situation shows that the Security Council 
resolution does not take into consideration that there could be a private security sector 
in Somalia, and the arms embargo did not anticipate the deployment of such security 
presences given that the arms embargo is being breached «every week, maybe even 
every day» (UN source no.1 2012 [interview]). 
 
PMSCs under the UN flag 
One can argue that PMSCs were introduced to Somalia through the UN sanctioned 
interventions in the 1990s: During the UNITAF and UNOSOM engagements PMSCs 
acted in support roles for western armies (Houston Chronicle 1992). The international 
interventions were founded on an idea of liberal peace based on western concepts of 
democracy, which Roger Mac Ginty claims was «manifest in virtually every post-Cold 
War intervention conducted in the name of ‘the international community’» (2010:578). 
Michael Barnett (2006) also claims that the liberal peace building paradigm became 
the underlying paradigm for many of the state building missions after 1991. The idea 
has been to reconstruct the intervened state as an ideal western liberal state. An 
important aspect in doing so has been to bolster the states to claim a monopoly of 
violence, and consequently military forces and contracted PMSCs became a part of the 
peace building agenda (Mac Ginty 2010:579-580). 
The AMISOM mission, which started to deploy its forces in 2007, has a 
mandate of establishing peace and democracy (Hull & Svensson 2008) and can be 
seen as yet another liberal peace building project in Somalia. PMSCs are currently 
working for both AMISOM and UN agencies, indeed, in general the use of PMSCs 
within the UN is rather extensive, and PMSCs frequently get involved in UN 
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operations especially through member state contingencies. This is a particularly 
common practice as far as US contributions to the UN are concerned (Østensen 
2011:13). But it is not only through member states PMSCs get involved in doing tasks 
under the UN flag. Østensen states that PMSC contracting appears to be a common 
practice of many of the UN agencies: «The private military and security industry 
increasingly offers services that penetrate some of the core activities and tasks of the 
United Nations and is eager to supplement the tasks often performed by UN 
organisations» (ibid:6). 
As mentioned above there was an increase of interventions conducted in the 
name of the international community after the Cold War, and since then the demand 
for UN delivery on the ground has increased massively. According to Østensen the 
development of UN personnel getting involved in hazardous areas is one of the main 
reasons why PMSCs have evolved to be an obvious part of many UN operations: 
The new operational environments have often been characterised by complex 
conflict structures and multiple emergencies. Not only do they tend to require 
more comprehensive operations, but they also represent the riskiest operational 
environments for international relief or peace operations personnel. Combined, 
these factors have put the United Nations under enormous stress in terms of 
human, financial and organisational capacities, and have consequently greatly 
contributed to the increased UN use of PMSCs (Østensen 2011:19) 
 
In Somalia, a number of PMSCs have entered the country under the umbrella of 
liberal peace building projects. It is preferable for PMSCs to be included in the liberal 
peace paradigm as opposed to being hired by local rulers, because a support operation 
for a local ruler will depend heavily on the ruler’s ability to fund the operation, and 
lack of success concerning funding will mean an absence of payment for the 
contracted company and ultimately the entire operations is thus likely to fail
2
. This is 
not to say that there would not be PMSCs in Somalia had they not been involved in the 
interventions in the 1990s. The proliferation of PMSCs on the international level, 
evolving for the last couple of decades, have been likely to primarily concern so-called 
areas of limited statehood or countries split by conflict, where legislation concerning 
regulation of private security providers is missing or not effectively enforced. 
(Krahmann 2009:II, 23). Somalia indisputably falls into this category. 
                                                        
2
 Examples of PMSCs that failed in Somalia due to lack of funding will be given in chapter five. 
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4.3 UN policies concerning PMSCs 
Even though there is widespread use of PMSCs within the UN, there is no coherent or 
consistent policy approach managing the system’s practice in the area. Rather, it is 
claimed that different political perspectives and practices flourish throughout the 
organization, and in part there is a coexistence of separate, and sometimes 
contradictory, approaches on the issue (Østensen 2011:41). 
After the reports of private security personnel killing civilians in Iraq the 
industry actively lobbied for regulations in order to increase the legitimacy of PMSCs. 
However, there were other voices opposed to such regulations because they feared that 
regulations would further undermine the norm of the states legitimate use of violence 
(Krahmann 2009:9). Rather than making regulations that would further legitimize 
PMSCs, one way in which the international community has tried to restrict the 
development of PMSCs is by condemning mercenary activity (Stinnett 2005:215)  
The Geneva Conventions define a mercenary as a foreign person who, despite 
not being a member of the armed forces in the conflict, is specifically recruited in 
order to fight and is motivated essentially by private gain. But the definition had its 
flaws: Due to political compromises among the signatory states, the negotiating parties 
added overly specific descriptions that limited the definition of mercenaries. «The 
conventions were amended to define mercenaries as only operating in international 
conflicts (some state parties wanted to use them internally), when, obviously enough, 
hired foreigners can and do fight in internal conflicts» (Singer 2008:41). The Geneva 
Conventions exclude military trainers, advisors, and support staff, and PMSCs that 
fully integrate into a client’s forces avoid mercenary classification (Stinnett 2005:216). 
Largely due to the perceived inadequacies in the mercenary protocol of the 
Geneva Conventions, the UN Mercenary Convention of 1989 extended mercenarism 
to cover all conflicts beyond just international armed conflicts. However, its definition 
still does not apply to most PMSCs «since it retains both the loophole for those 
combatants who integrate into a client’s armed forces and the problems associated 
with ascerting a combatant’s motivation for fighting» (ibid:217). In addition, many 
PMSCs typically operate in areas where there is no declared war, are often employed 
by private actors, and do not engage in offensive military action, making it difficult to 
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decide whether they are combatants (Krahmann 2009:II). The UN Mercenary 
Convention has very little support from member states, and it is widely recognized that 
neither the Geneva Conventions’ or the UN Mercenary Convention’s definitions of 
mercenaries cover a majority of the existing PMSCs (UN source no.1. 2012 
[interview]; Østensen 2011:59). 
UN agencies can thus contract PMSCs without being concerned about violating 
international law or its own guidelines, and the issue of PMSC contracting has so far 
very rarely been dealt with in an open manner within the organization, except from 
within the «UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating 
Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of Rights of Peoples to Self Determination» 
(Østensen 2011:40). Although the current Working Group’s view appears to be 
divided, in general it seems to think that PMSCs represent a new form of mercenarism, 
according to Østensen (ibid). Due to the limitations in the Geneva Conventions and the 
UN Mercenary Convention, and faced with an explosion in the number of PMSCs, the 
Working Group drafted a convention to regulate PMSCs – the 2009 Draft International 
Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and 
Security Companies, which stipulates various ways states should take responsibility 
for PMSC activities, but does not mention the UN’s use of PMSCs. (ibid:59-60) 
While it may not be within the working group’s mandate to assess the UN line 
of policies, action or attitudes in terms of PMSC contracting, this body would 
inspire more confidence if UN use were taken into account. The draft 
convention offers few applicable solutions and accordingly appears a largely 
normative and prescriptive document. (ibid:61) 
 
 
4.4 Summary 
It is claimed that the UN Security Council did not recognize that there could be a 
private security sector in Somalia and that the arms embargo is frequently breached 
(UN source no.1 2012 [interview]). But not all PMSCs in Somalia are in violation of 
the arms embargo – a number of private actors have entered the country under the 
umbrella of the liberal peace paradigm. PMSCs have been – and are currently – 
working under the auspices of UN approved interventions. Concerning the UN’s 
policies, the normative views expressed by the Working Group stand in contrast to the 
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more pragmatic approach of those securing staff and assets while maintaining 
operations in difficult operating areas, and Østensen claims that the UN as a whole is 
little integrated and coordinated in terms of the PMSC question: «The most obvious 
commonality [within the UN] is, unfortunately, a consistent lack of clear and 
articulated policies concerning the use of PMSCs» (2011:65) 
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Chapter five: Types of PMSCs in Somalia 
 
5.1 Introduction 
«Numerous private security companies currently operate in Somalia, with several 
providing, or intending to provide, support to Somali security sector institutions» (UN 
Security Council 2012).  According to a TFG-source there were about 50 private 
contractors related to the security industry in the green zone at the airport in 
Mogadishu in 2011 (TFG source no.1 2012 [interview]). Peter Cross, civilian police 
project manager in UNDP, agrees that there is a considerable number of contractors 
present in Mogadishu, but assesses the number to be significantly lower than the TFG 
official (2012 [interview]). One reason for the range in estimates may be that many of 
the companies do not identify themselves as PMSCs, but as working with for instance 
logistics or demining, and consequently calculating a number is difficult.  
To determine how PMSCs affect institutions in Somalia it has been necessary to 
try to find out to what extent PMSCs are being used in the country. To get an 
absolutely precise picture would require tedious mapping of all present security 
companies – a close to impossible task within the scope of this thesis, as there exists 
no registration of all the PMSCs present in Somalia, and no one can give an accurate 
number as to how many companies actually operate within the state territories. 
Consequently, this thesis does not seek to map all PMSCs in Somalia. Instead it will 
focus on a few companies and through them show the variety of actors present in 
south-central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland. PMSCs in Somalia are not a 
homogenous group, but span all the categories in Singer’s «tip of the spear»-typology. 
The selection of companies is made based on knowledge gained from informants and 
reports from the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. 
 
 
5.2 A part of the liberal peace agenda 
Bancroft Global Development is currently the only PMSC operating in Somalia with 
authorization from the Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council. The 
committee does not specifically authorize Bancroft, but because Bancroft has a 
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contract with AMISOM it benefits from the permanent exemption of the arms 
embargo that is granted to AMISOM (UN Security Coucil 2012). Bancroft has not 
been directly approved, but since the company is contracted by AMISOM it has the 
right to operate in Somalia to provide what it labels mentoring, which is actually 
military training (UN source no.1 2012 [interview]). By Singer’s typology Bancroft is 
a «military consulting firm», but the company is registered as a foundation in the US 
and does not consider itself a PMSC. In Mogadishu the company has about 40 
employees, mainly South Africans and Europeans, whose jobs vary from doing 
logistics to giving military training. Officially the company does not have anyone on 
the frontline, but reports have been made of Bancroft personnel carrying weapons on 
the frontline being perceived as fighting soldiers and not just trainers –  placing it 
closer to «the tip of the spear» (UN source no.1 [interview]; New York Times 2011). 
The governments of Uganda and Burundi pay Bancroft to train their AMISOM-
soldiers for missions inside Somalia. The US State Department then reimburses the 
two African states, and through this arrangement of serving as a sort of proxy for the 
American government Bancroft earned about seven million dollars from 2010 until 
August 2011 (New York Times 2011). 
The TFG owes its survival to AMISOM rather than to its own troops (UN 
Security Council 2010:6), and AMISOM owes some of its success to Bancroft.  The 
Ugandan and Burundi armed forces had been trained to fight in the bush, so when they 
arrived in Mogadishu the forces were facing a new type of operation in a sort of urban 
warfare with roadside bombs and suicide attacks. The US decided that the forces 
needed training to face the new realities, but because of the history of intervention and 
the mentioned «Somalia effect» deployment of US military advisors would not be 
acceptable, and it was decided that a capable company would be contracted to provide 
the training (UN source no.1, [interview]). 
It is within the AMISOM mandate that the force support and protect the TFG 
and its infrastructure (Hull & Svensson 2008:8), meaning that AMISOM has a duty 
and is committed to provide support to the TFG army, police and security sector 
institutions. In fulfilling this task Bancroft does some work directly for the TFG, 
including policy development aid (UN source no.2 [interview]). According to Peter 
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Cross one can argue that there exists a clear conflict of interest seeing that Bancroft in 
some instances work on both sides of the equation and actually assist in developing the 
government policy that will help the company get more jobs, either directly with the 
TFG, through AMISOM or through UN agencies (2012 [interview]). 
AMISOM can, and has, hired other companies under its umbrella in addition to 
Bancroft. These actors do not have a permanent exemption from the arms embargo, 
but get exemptions within the framework of specific projects and get in through peace 
building programs serving AMISOM in some way or form. One such program is the 
US Department of State Africa Peacekeeping Program (AFRICAP), which uses 
contractors to provide military training, perform advisory missions and provide 
logistical support and construction services for programs across Africa (AECOM 
2012). Worth mentioning in this context is DynCorp International, AECOM and 
Pacific Architects & Engineers (PAE), companies that have all signed contracts with 
AFRICAP including «provision of logistics support, construction, military training and 
advising, maritime security capacity building, equipment procurement, operational 
deployment for peacekeeping troops, aerial surveillance and conference facilitation» 
for AMISOM (UN Security Council 2011:256). DynCorp was one of the companies 
providing support to the peacekeeping mission in Somalia in 1992-1995, and has for 
long been one of the contractors frequently used by the US, including in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (Forbes 2007; Hansen 2008:594). DynCorp was again chosen when the 
AMISOM mission went into Mogadishu in 2007, but in 2010 the company lost its 
contract to PAE and AECOM, which are now providing logistical support to 
AMISOM (Somalia Report 2011) 
 
«Legitimate actors» outside the AMISOM mission  
There are plentiful of companies operating in Mogadishu that do not work for 
AMISOM, but which can still be considered a part of liberal peace paradigm. A 
growing number of foreign private security personnel and companies in Somalia 
provide security details for individuals, foreign companies, diplomatic missions, the 
TFG, NGOs and international organizations. Some supervise local militia and provide 
armed escorts and static guards, «often importing armored vehicles, personal 
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protective equipment and operating in an arguably paramilitary fashion» (UN Security 
Council 2012:24; UN source no.1 [interview]). Without proper authorization those 
kinds of actions are in violation of the arms embargo, and in its 2012 report the UN 
Monitoring Group lists a number of member states that have acted in non-compliance 
with the arms embargo, and also mentions the UN itself: 
During the course of the mandate, Ethiopia, France, the Sudan, Turkey, the 
United Arab Emirates, the United Nations and the United States have all 
provided support to Somali security sector institutions without providing prior 
notice or obtaining advance authorization from the Committee. (UN Security 
Council 2012:25) 
 
According to a UN source many of the violations made by state actors would 
have been granted exemption had they requested it for the actions. And violations 
made by private individuals or entities with what the source describes as legitimate 
interests, like a private security business interest, are less of a concern for the 
Monitoring Group than weapons or equipment being imported by for instance the 
insurgency group al-Shabab. Both are violations of the embargo, but unoficially a 
distinction is made between violations for legitimate purposes, and the al-Shabab 
violating the embargo to attack the TFG, AMISOM or other potential targets. A 
majority of the violations come from what the source label as legitimate parties, so the 
Monitoring Group differs between for example a business importing armored vehicles 
and the al-Shabab importing ammunition or equipment (UN source no.1 [interview]). 
The Kenya based company Halliday Finch, one of the many PMSCs operating 
in Mogadishu, admits it may occasionally violate the embargo unintentionally, but 
insists that mistakes are always rectified. When the research for this thesis was done 
the company was in the process of establishing an office in Mogadishu. Up until the 
permanent office is in place, the company has sent its employees into Somalia on an 
ad hoc basis, mainly doing escort duty for dignitaries. Initially the plan is to set up a 
control room at the green zone at the airport in Mogadishu, put armored cars on the 
ground and provide an armored taxi service for anyone coming in and out of 
Mogadishu. But according to Sam Mattock, Chief Executive Officer of Halliday 
Finch, a company that wants to have a sustainable business in Mogadishu has to have 
a goal of moving out of the secure gates of the airport: «Whilst the risk profile 
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increases enormously by doing so, it is my belief that if you want to get things done 
and have the respect of the Somalis you have to be self-sufficient, in the same way that 
the are in that city» (Mattock 2012 [interview]). Mattock is an ex British Army officer 
and has worked in the private security industry in various African countries for years, 
which is typical feature for many of the actors in the PMSC industry. Although the 
planned mission center in Mogadishu will be led by a European, Mattock affirms that 
«you cannot have a bunch of white guys running around thinking they have a solution 
to security», and therefore aims at hiring mostly Somalis (ibid). 
Although a company, like Halliday Finch, is not contracted by AMISOM or a 
UN agency it can still be considered a part of a liberal peace-building project in a 
wider sense. Many security outfits are there to provide for the security of NGOs and 
humanitarian organizations, and their presence is thus considered legitimate. In 
Halliday Finch’s case, too, the company provides services that would typically be 
considered legitimate by the Monitoring Group (UN source no.1 [interview]). 
Within what one can label as the frames of the liberal peace agenda, there is 
also an opaque CIA-trained and financed group operating in Mogadishu (New York 
Times 2011). The troops cover their faces and wear ski masks; weapon wise they are 
well equipped; had it not been for the fact that the soldiers were making arrests the 
general public would assume it was a PMSC (Mohamed 2012 [interview]). This group 
is in fact a part of the Somali National Security Agency, an intelligence organization 
that answers to the TFG. It is, though, claimed that the Somali intelligence service is 
building a power base independent of the weak government, and that the Security 
Agency is becoming a government within the government (New York Times 2011). 
 
 
5.3 An uncertain existence outside liberal interventionism 
Halliday Finch provides security services that are considered legitimate, but it has 
previously approached the TFG with a type of offer that the Monitoring Group does 
not care for. Halliday Finch had a contractual obligation with the TFG regarding the 
construction of a national coast guard, but because of uncertainty concerning the 
planned shift from transitional to permanent government in Mogadishu, the project’s 
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financial backer got out last minute in March 2012 (Mattock 2012 [interview]). 
Halliday Finch argues that its planned program was sustainable because fishing 
revenues going ten years forward were secured in a deal where, according to Mattock, 
Somalia would pay for its own resources as Halliday Finch would do fishing 
monitoring, impose fines to anyone doing illegal fishing and control the funds coming 
in for fishing licenses (Mattock 2012 [interview]). It is this type of arrangement a UN 
source states the Monitoring Group is not fond of, and calls a matter of concern 
regarding the presence of PMSCs. Neither the federal nor the local administrations 
have budgets that allow them to contract a PMSC, according to the source, and 
consequently they would have to trade natural resources for security services, while 
preferably the administrations should be able to manage their own resources to get 
revenues (UN source no.1 2012 [interview]). 
Halliday Finch is not the only company that has made plans that never made it 
beyond the drawing board. Other actors have in previous years also signed contracts 
concerning provision of coastal services. International actors like Top Cat Maritime, 
Northbridge Service Group, the Hart Group and the Somali, but Emirates registered 
and based, SOMCAN all operated outside liberal interventionism and all faced an 
insecure existence (Hansen 2008:590-594). 
Top Cat, an American company that despite defining itself as a security 
company had little security experience, approached the TFG and offered to provide 
services to the government’s non-existent coast guard in 2005. A contract estimated to 
be worth 50 million dollars was signed, but the company did not manage to establish 
any facilities in Somalia, and by spring 2006 the company declared the contract 
invalid (Hansen 2008:591). Northbridge was Top Cat’s replacement in south-central 
Somalia. Again a contract was signed, and the funds were supposed to be raised from 
donors as Northbridge argued it could handle tasks that would benefit not only the new 
Somali government, but also non-Somali powers and the international community. 
«But rather than attracting support from Western governments, the fact that the TFG 
and Puntland simultaneously hired different PSCs caused some international concern, 
as the two entities at times refused to acknowledge each other’s rights to natural 
resources» (ibid:592). The result was that Northbridge never entered Somalia. 
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The Puntland authorities hired a British company called the Hart Group, which 
got its income through a fishing license scheme much like the one suggested by 
Halliday Finch, to establish a coast guard in 2000. Initially Hart had success and was 
efficient in capturing what the Puntland authorities claimed to be actors of illegal 
fishing, but due to internal conflicts within Puntland the company’s Somali employees 
were split into different fractions, and «when fighting erupted close to Hart’s bases of 
operation, the company decided to withdraw» (ibid:588). Subsequently Hart was 
replaced by SOMCAN, a company strongly connected to the Puntland elite. The 
company was deeply integrated in Puntland politics and was awarded a five-year 
contract, but later encountered serious difficulties because of its close relation to the 
administration. When, in 2005, Puntland elected a president with a different clan 
background than the former president, the relationship between SOMCAN and the 
Puntland administration rapidly crumbled (ibid:589). Although both Hart and 
SOMCAN were originally relatively successful compared to the companies that tried 
to set up in south-central Somalia, their turbulent history shows that it is far from easy 
for PMSCs to operate outside international interventionism. 
 
«The PMSC of greatest concern» 
Up until very recently the provider of coastal security in Puntland was Sterling 
Corporate Services (SCS), a Dubai-registered company that provided military training, 
technical assistance and support to the Puntland Maritime Police Force. The company 
is named the biggest reason for concern regarding PMSC activity by the Monitoring 
Group in its 2012 report. SCS was mentioned in last year’s report as well, but the 
company then operated under the name Saracen International (UN Security Council 
2012:8). The company is by Singer’s typology a first and second category PMSC 
claimed to have a modern operational command center, control tower, airstrip, 
helicopter deck and the possibility to host up to 1500 trainees, thus the training camp 
near Bosaaso was said to be the best-equipped military facility in Somalia after the 
AMISOM bases in Mogadishu.  
Thanks to this massive initiative, the Puntland Maritime Police Force is now a 
well equipped elite force, over 1000 strong, with air assets used to carry out 
ground attacks, which operates beyond the rule of law and reports directly to 
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the President of Puntland. (UN Security Council 2012:22) 
 
SCS has links to Erik Dean Prince, the owner and Chief Executive Officer of 
the infamous PMSC Blackwater Worldwide, which was behind the killing of civilians 
in Iraq in 2007 (UN Security Council 2012:274; New York Times 2011). One of the 
main reasons why SCS was named such a concern was that the company had a 
massive presence of foreign personnel, mainly South African military trainers who 
were former members of the paramilitary Civil Cooperation Bureau during the 
apartheid era, in support of a central Puntland institution, with little accountability, 
making it close to impossible to hold anyone responsible for the company’s actions. 
(UN source no.1 2012 [interview]; New York Times 2012). Piracy has been a vast 
problem in the area for years, and had a member state of the UN notified the Sanctions 
Committee on behalf of SCS/Saracen requesting to train Puntland maritime forces 
under the terms of the arms embargo, it is not unlikely that the request had been 
authorized, according to a UN source (UN source no.1 2012 [interview]). But the force 
has been financed through disguised contributions from the United Arab Emirates and 
Abu Dhabi, and no one in the UN system has been informed about the situation on the 
ground (UN source no.1 2012 [interview]; UN Security Council 2012:22)  
SCS has undoubtedly been in constant breach of the arms embargo, and since 
the company operates independently of all international, multilateral frameworks for 
support to the Somali security sector, there is no way to ensure that the forces the 
company trains are in fact employed for the purposes of improving the maritime 
security off the coast through the Puntland Maritime Police Force. Due to a lack of 
transparency there have been concerns as to SCS/Saracen’s intentions since the 
company first set foot in Puntland in 2010 (UN source no.1 2012 [interview]; Cross 
2012 [interview]). The company’s «presence has increased tension in north-eastern 
Somalia because its operations are perceived as a military threat by Puntland’s 
neighbours, as well as by some parts of the Puntland population» (UN Security 
Council 2011:282). The port director in Berbera in Somaliland labels SCS/Saracen a 
mafia business and accuses the Puntland administration of training pirates through the 
company, and of using it as an invading force to take control over natural resources 
within Somaliland’s territories (Omer Mohamed 2012 [interview]). Claims have also 
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been made that the SCS/Saracen force is actually an elite military unit intended to 
make sure the Puntland administration will overpower opposing clans in areas where 
oil exploration is considered probable in the future, and again the linkage of a PMSC 
to natural resources is a reason for concern (Economist 2012 [interview]; UN source 
no.1 2012 [interview]; Cross 2012 [interview]; UN Security Council 2011:283). 
Recent reports conclude that SCS left Puntland this summer due to loss of its 
financing for the project, and that Bancroft has been asked to assess if the SCS-trained 
soldiers could be integrated into existing security sector institutions in order to reduce 
the potential risk the forces pose. According to the New York Times’ sources the SCS 
soldiers are not as many as calculated by the UN Monitoring Group, but they have 
gone months without pay and are well-armed, potentially posing a serious threat if 
they are not assimilated or disarmed (New York Times 2012). SCS’ descent came 
after one of their South African military trainers were shot and killed by one of the 
trainees in April (Somaliland Press 2012), a sort of incident many were almost waiting 
for to happen according to Peter Cross (2012 [interview]). After the fatal event SCS 
claimed it tightened its screening for applicants to the force, but not long after the 
trainers and most of the equipment had left Puntland (New York Times 2012). 
It is worth mentioning that SCS/Saracen has tried to tap into the security 
industry in south-central Somalia as well. In 2011 the company envisaged a training 
program for the TFG security forces in Mogadishu, including a new presidential 
security unit in counter-terrorism, VIP protection and a range of other skills. But this 
initiative was suspended indefinitely after resistance from the Transitional Federal 
Parliament, AMISOM, and members of the international community who feared the 
consequences of what is assumed to be a first category «military provider firm» PMSC 
contracted directly by the TFG. (UN Security Council 2011; Ashereh 2012 
[interview]; Independent Online News 2012). With the recent development concerning 
the company’s presence in Puntland it seems SCS is yet another PMSC operating 
outside liberal interventionism that has been forced to disband. 
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5.4 Somaliland – other types of PMSCs 
The security situation differs considerably between the distinctive Somali territories. 
Somaliland has a «relatively democratic political structure, a rudimentary police and 
coast guard, as well as a legal system that functions in its core areas» (Hansen 
2008:585) and consequently other types of PMSCs are operating there than in south-
central Somalia. The Norwegian company Nordic Crisis Management’s (NCM) 
activity is relatively limited compared to the PMSCs mentioned so far and offers an 
illustration of the range of PMSCs involved in improving the security throughout 
Somalia. NCM has been contracted by the Somaliland administration since 2006 to 
develop a security system for the Berbera port and to ensure that the port’s security 
meets the standards set by the UN and the International Maritime Organization, 
accordingly making the port more attractive to shipping companies and reducing the 
insurance costs when their ships dock in Berbera. The original five-year contract 
expired in 2011, but as the port still requires NCM’s assistance the company’s 
involvement is prolonged (Francke 2012 [interview]; Omer Mohamed 2012 
[interview]). The company does not have traditional security personnel and there is not 
a NCM presence in Berbera at all times, rather advisors fly down a few times a year 
and stay there typically a couple of weeks building expertise and providing equipment 
so that the locals are able to operate the port in accordance with the international 
standards (2012 [interview]). Nonetheless, the work is extremely important since the 
Berbera port is the single most important source of revenue for Somaliland, 
representing between 80 and 90 percent of the national income (ibid). The fact that an 
international security standard is maintained has enormous value not only for 
Somaliland, but also for Ethiopia since Berbera is one of the few large ports serving 
the country (Omer Mohamed 2012 [interview]). 
The project is funded entirely by development assistance from NORAD, a 
directorate under the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and according to CEO 
Herbert Francke, it is important for NCM that the project is firmly rooted in the 
Ministry (2012 [interview]). «It is in many ways a unique case, and so far the only 
private security operation in Somalia to be financed solely from development aid» 
(Hansen 2008:594). The fact that the project is entrenched in the Norwegian 
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authorities is important for NCM both formally and economically (Francke 2012 
[interview]). As such the company’s presence is can be considered a part of a liberal 
peace paradigm, the difference from many other liberal peace based PMSCs being that 
its operation is based on development aid and does not stem directly from an 
international intervention. 
The port director affirms that the project is an important link for Somaliland to 
the Norwegian government (Omer Mohamed [interview]). The political and 
economical implications are positive for Somaliland, but it is relevant to emphasize 
that NCM provides assistance to a political and administrative structure that wants 
independence but which the international community have refused to recognize as a 
sovereign state. «Norway’s support for Somaliland’s state-like structures can […] be 
seen as, and de facto is, support for state building in Somaliland, and the project can be 
seen to indirectly strengthen Somaliland’s claim to statehood» (Hansen 2008:595) 
 
One locally registered PMSC 
Another kind of PMSC in Somaliland is the local company Physical Risk Solutions 
(PRS). Managed by a former South African military and a local businessman, PRS is 
at the moment the only private military or security company registered in Somaliland. 
PRS provides a variety of security services, but mainly delivers security services with 
trained but unarmed guards and internal compound security services with relevant 
equipment like metal detectors and x-ray machines. Its Somaliland operations director 
says that in principle the company’s services are open to both internationals and locals, 
but due to the price level, in reality only international organizations, NGOs and big 
companies can afford to contract PRS (Farah 2012 [interview]). 
When PRS was founded the Somaliland authorities were not aware of the 
possibility of the existence of a private security industry, and consequently there 
existed no regulations within which PRS had to oblige. The Ministry of Interior 
originally objected to PRS’ continuation, but the company was allowed to resume its 
operations, like compound security for the UNDP in Hargeisa, while all registration of 
other PMSCs were put on hold (Farah 2012 [interview]; Cross 2012 [interview]). The 
Somaliland administration is currently in the process of adopting a new legislation, 
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specifically with the aim of controlling the activities of the PMSC industry in the 
Somaliland territories. The UNDP has assisted in the development of this regulatory 
framework, resulting in a private security company act containing regulations and a 
code of conduct for the Somaliland PMSCs (Cross 2012 [interview]; UN Security 
Council 2011). 
Although there is only one PMSC officially operating in Somaliland, many 
businesses and hotels have armed and unarmed individuals to protect their properties. 
Many of these individuals are in fact police officers, and the Somaliland government 
has announced that it will command police officers that are doing security services to 
return to do regular police duties, hence a vacuum will be created where the market for 
security guards will grow larger (Farah 2012 [interview]). However, the new 
regulatory framework concerning PMSCs clearly states that security guards cannot be 
armed, creating defined boundaries to avoid any conflict between them and the police. 
PRS’ operations director is divided in his view on the use of firearms by security 
entities. As a Somaliland citizen he supports the ban because he claims that armed 
security companies can be a threat to the national stability and can ultimately weaken 
the government. He remembers the less peaceful times in Hargeisa, when «everyone 
had a gun», and asserts that to protect the present stability in Somaliland the 
administration has to have monopoly on the use of armed force (ibid). However, as a 
businessman Farah admits that he would make more money if his forces were armed. 
PRS seeks to expand its business to both Bosaaso in Puntland and to Mogadishu, and 
its guards outside of Somaliland are likely to be armed. The operational structure is not 
certain, but especially in Mogadishu the potential PRS forces will surely carry 
weapons (ibid). 
 
 
5.5 Current militia, future PMSC? 
The regulatory framework for local PMSCs in south-central Somalia is far from as 
defined as it is in Somaliland. Yet there are a significant number of local militias 
operating in Mogadishu, in the same fashion as many of the international security 
enterprises, providing static guards and armed escort services. The PMSC-like 
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militias’ object of protection is generally private and they are of a defensive nature, 
although they are armed and can accordingly not be labeled non-lethal. 
UN agencies were for long dependent on the AMISOM forces to move around 
in Mogadishu. But this arrangement was seen as problematic as there were only a 
limited number of AMISOM convoys available to the provision of non-AMISOM 
tasks per week, and a lot of those priorities were given to political office or 
humanitarian work, so agencies like the UNDP were getting bumped regularly (Cross 
2012 [interview]). On this basis a decision was taken late 2011 that the agency would 
take measures to increase its own independent movement capacity. This process ended 
with the UNDP operating with local PMSCs, which are basically local militia groups, 
procured in cooperation with the Ministry of Interior, which has started a registration 
process for local security providers (Cross 2012 [interview]). A UN source states it is 
pleasing to see increasingly legitimate Somali security businesses popping up. But 
although the attempt to start a registration process is an important first step, seeing that 
ideally there should not be individuals with arms that are not a part of either a security 
sector institution or a registered PMSC, a the source says that it is difficult to imagine 
anyone passing a law regulating PMSCs in Mogadishu in the near future given the fact 
that implementing the similar framework in much more peaceful and transparent 
Somaliland has been difficult (UN source no.1 2012 [interview]). The UNDP police 
project manager admits that even if a regulatory framework controlling PMSCs was 
installed, there is no mechanism to ensure that it is properly enforced (Cross 2012 
[interview]). 
A growing number of hotels in Mogadishu have been employing local clan 
militias as security forces for their businesses. As AMISOM has been successful in 
driving al-Shabab out of the capital, more and more areas have been liberated making 
new businesses pop up. And as long as AMISOM’s positive trend continues, the 
phenomenon of this mix between clan based and business based militias protecting 
local establishments’ premises is likely to grow (Economist 2012, [interview]). 
Numerous of the hotels in the capital are hosting expat-meetings where members of 
the Somali diaspora living abroad return to discuss the development of their home 
country, and most of these hotels have organized security provided by militias 
 43 
(Mohamed 2012 [interview]). Several of the hotels offer complete security packages 
for their visitors, including armed security escorts and accommodation, and some of 
the hotel owners are becoming quite influential because of the security militia forces 
they have at their command (Mohamed 2012 [interview]; Cross 2012 [interview]). The 
potential transition from militia to local security businesses is seen as a positive step 
by many Somalis, both concerning stabilization and employment of the local youth 
(Economist 2012 [interview]; Mohamed 2012 [interview]). The various markets across 
Mogadishu also have PMSC-like entities providing security, and although these 
groups are have structures that resemble security companies, they are not registered 
and licensed and are thus in reality militias (Mohamed 2012 [interview]). 
Having been escorted by both AMISOM forces and by local private armed 
security units Peter Cross believes that the latter is a better and more community 
friendly approach that leaves a lighter footprint. Since there are militias everywhere 
across Mogadishu unmarked landcruisers with armed personnel is not something 
unusual, and actually offers better access than an AMISOM convoy. When travelling 
with AMISOM, according to Cross, you easily get the feeling that the whole city is 
conspiring to stop you from moving: «Donkeys will pull out in front of you, trucks 
will pull out and stop, groups of school children stand in the middle of the road, 
everywhere you go things block the way and you feel like a target» (Cross 2012 
[interview]). 
Halliday Finch has assisted an up-and-coming Somali PMSC in getting 
international customers. When approached by an American TV-team Halliday Finch 
subcontracted the Somali unit to escort the journalist across Mogadishu, but also had a 
member of its own staff with the group. The journalists would not have trusted the 
Somali company had it not been for Halliday Finch, but through the arrangement both 
companies got a revenue stream and the Somali company could add the journalists to 
its list of clients (Mattock 2012 [interview]). As previously mentioned Sam Mattock 
believes it is best to have a blend of internationals and Somalis within a PMSC. He is 
of the opinion that a mixed approach assures that one gets the extreme local 
knowledge of the nationals and the international experience and exposure one would 
get from for instance European former soldiers, inasmuch as they are often well 
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educated and have prior security experience from other areas (Mattock 2012 
[interview]). Farah, the operations director in Somaliland based PRS, is of the opinion 
that throughout Somalia it is preferable to hire Somali companies because the 
nationals know the culture and the clan structures, which traditionally play an 
important role in the country. Although PRS does not have an official policy 
concerning the issue of clanism, the company does background checks, including talks 
with clan elders, on all potential new employees when it hires security guards. Farah 
underlines the importance Somali companies can make, not only to security, but also 
concerning employment, and while international PMSCs also hire Somali guards, 
Farah argues that his company is better fit to deal with the volatile and chaotic 
situation in Somalia than international companies are since he as a national knows the 
Somali culture (Farah 2012 [interview]). 
 
Nobody trusts the police 
When the UNDP in 2011 decided to take measures to expand its mobility in 
Mogadishu, the original thought was to increase the capacity of the police to do this, 
according to an anonymous UN source. But an assessment revealed that the police 
lacked in training and equipment; the forces had insufficient command and control; 
they were insufficiently disciplined and did not have access across Mogadishu. 
Militias basically control most of the city’s districts, and if these militias do not want 
the police in the area they simply stop them by attacking. And the clan militias are 
better armed and better paid, so the police’s chances are usually poor.  (UN source 
no.2 2012 [interview]) 
Although the police commissioner of Mogadishu claim there is absolutely no 
necessity for private security and that the Somali people only need the police for its 
protection (Maye 2012 [interview]), native Somalis living in the capital confirm that 
the general public cannot trust the police and TFG forces (Mohamed 2012 [interview]; 
Economist 2012 [interview]). Several sources state that the police often go months 
without receiving any salary, and as Mogadishu lawyer Zakaria Mohamed put it: 
«How can you expect a man with a gun to protect the people when he gets no payment 
and his family does not even have food?» (2012 [interview]). 
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Another issue is that there is quite a high rate of what is called blue on blue 
incidents – episodes where fractions of the police fight each other, the police and the 
National Security Agency fight each other or the TFG military and the police fight 
each other (UN source no.2 [interview]). According to an anonymous UN source 
everybody within the police has vested interests: It could be that control over an area is 
linked to one district commissioner or another, fractions of the security forces are in 
some instances linked to diversion of food aid, the reasons are numerous. It was due to 
this that the UNDP concluded that the police could not provide the security its staff 
needed, but actually created a more insecure environment for anybody travelling with 
them in many cases (UN source no.2 2012 [interview]). According to another UN 
source it is a major concern, but still a well-known fact, that it is safer to travel with 
local militias than with the police in Mogadishu (UN source no.1 2012 [interview]). 
 
 
5.6 Summary 
There is a mixture of types of PMSCs across Somalia. Bancroft is the main PMSC-
contributor to AMISOM and by Singer’s typology can be classified as a «military 
consulting firm» providing military training, although some reports suggests that the 
company has had soldiers at the frontline and could thus be seen to be closer to «the 
tip of the spear» (UN source no.1 2012 [interview]; New York Times 2011). Third 
category PMSCs, «military support firms» by Singer’s typology, like PAE and 
AECOM are also working in support of AMISOM. Although not under AMISOM’s 
umbrella, a number of PMSCs providing security for NGOs, humanitarian 
organizations and private individuals are also seen as a part of the liberal peace 
paradigm because their interests are perceived to be legitimate (UN source no.1 2012 
[interview]). The services offered by these PMSCs, like Halliday Finch, include 
transportation and static guarding, and are primarily of a defensive nature. But escorts 
are armed and missions can end up being lethal, hence this type of PMSC is difficult to 
classify within Singer’s typology.  
The security situation differs considerably between the regions, and Somaliland 
does not require the same amount of or types of PMSCs as south-central Somalia. 
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NCM is a «military support company» providing simply expertise and advice in order 
to enable the security at the port of Berbera to meet international standards (Francke 
2012 [interview]; Omer Mohamed 2012 [interview]). 
Until recently the «military provider firm» SCS/Saracen was located in Bosaaso 
to build and support the Puntland Maritime Police Force. The force operated 
independently of all international frameworks for support to the Somali security sector 
and was financed through disguised contributions (UN source no.1 2012 [interview]; 
UN Security Council 2012:22). SCS/Saracen is reported to have left Puntland this 
summer after loss of financing, and as such is the latest of a number of PMSCs 
working detached from the liberal peace agenda that have had short-lived ventures in 
Somalia. 
Local PMSCs might play an increasing part in the Somali security sector. 
Currently one PMSC, providing mainly unarmed compound security and static guards, 
is registered in Somaliland. In south-central Somalia the regulatory framework is not 
as developed as in Somaliland, but a growing number of militias are acting in a 
PMSC-like fashion and there is hope that these entities will be regulated in the future 
(Cross 2012 [interview]; Economist 2012 [interview]; Mohamed 2012 [interview]; UN 
source no.1 2012 [interview]). 
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Chapter six: Somalis’ perception of PMSCs 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Among most of the interviewees in this thesis, who are not a part of the PMSC 
industry, there is concern regarding the transparency and accountability of the various 
private contractors in Somalia. The general public is well aware that there is a large 
presence of private contractors at the airport in Mogadishu, but not many know the 
companies’ names, who they are contracted by or what services they are actually in 
Somalia to provide. As a result most of the PMSCs are seen as mercenaries that have 
been given legitimacy by the TFG, AMISOM and the UN (Economist 2012 
[interview]; Issa 2012 [interview]; Ashereh 2012 [interview]). Although based on a 
relatively moderate number of interviews, this chapter gives an impression of how 
PMSCs are perceived by Somalis. 
 
 
6.2 Lack of transparency and accountability 
The example of Halliday Finch subcontracting a local militia-like group mentioned in 
the previous chapter is perhaps an innocent example that turned out to be a win-win 
situation for the involved parties. A chain of companies linked together is a typical 
trait of the globalized world trade, but in principle this corporate structure of 
subcontracting can diffuse accountability: It can be difficult to track which companies 
are responsible for specific operations in a chain of companies, and this can make it 
hard to determine who are responsible for monitoring the PMSCs. Also, it can be 
unclear who is responsible of sanctioning if an employee of a subcontracted company 
acts inappropriate or breaks the law (Singer 2008:220). 
Among some Somalis there is a hope that the international private security 
enterprises can be a gate opener to international investments in Somalia (Economist 
2012 [interview]). Holmqvist affirms that the use of PMSCs by a weak state can 
provide a boost to security sector capabilities and provide a quick avenue for donor 
states to channel support (2005:17). However, it may also be at the expense of the aim 
of increasing standards of democratic accountability within security sector institutions 
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since there is a loss of local knowledge. There is a general acknowledgment among 
Somalis that armed security is needed (Mohamed 2012 [interview]; Economist 2012 
[interview]), but towards foreign security actors there is generally a negative attitude, 
and as Somali Member of Parliament Hon Awad Ahmed Ashereh put it: «They are not 
well informed about the clan set up and the culture of Somalia» (2012 [interview]).  
[U]sing private actors to implement SSR [security sector reform] programmes 
in weak states involves certain losses such as knowledge of local conditions 
and the future interoperability of forces, both with donor states and with their 
own neighbours. In this way, the use of PSCs to carry out military training or 
other SSR tasks risks depriving the relationship between donor and recipient of 
political content and exacerbating the difficulty of securing local ownership in 
SSR projects by introducing a third, commercial rather than political, actor into 
the equation. (Holmqvist 2005:17) 
 
Peter Cross upholds that priority should be given to develop the capacity of the 
police and the authorities to provide for security, but security sector institutions are not 
able to provide the required security at the moment and thus PMSCs are needed (2012 
[interview]). Cross calls the PMSC presence in Somalis a «necessary evil» and says 
the business has very little accountability and transparency, labeling it as dirty in that 
way (ibid). Member of Parliament Ashereh describes foreign PMSCs as a conspiracy 
against the sovereignty of Somalia and an open door to corruption because a consistent 
lack of transparency encourages officials to make personal gain from contracts 
(Ashere 2012 [interview]). The lack of transparency is not exclusively on the hands of 
PMSCs but in a sense pervades all off Somalia, according to Cross, as there is no 
proper auditing done in the government and what auditing is done reveals 
mismanagement and corruption. Hence he insists that it is better that PMSCs are hired 
by international organizations than directly by the TFG (Cross 2012 [interview]), 
while the security business sees no principally difference as «funds come out of the 
same location anyway because the TFG does not have any funds» (Mattock 2012 
[interview]. Holmqvist (2005) writes that, in general, there is a deficiency in terms of 
accountability and legitimacy whether PMSCs are contracted directly by a weak state 
to bolster security capabilities or by donors to carry out military training or increase 
other capacity within security sector institutions.  
Amnesty International USA has pointed out that there are no requirements for 
the inclusion of any human rights or humanitarian law content […] in military, 
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security or police force training conducted by private security actors. (ibid:16). 
 
Somali interviewees, who are not a part of the TFG or the PMSC business, 
express great concern about the situation. With Somalia’s history of being the subject 
of foreign intervention, armed foreign forces have a hugely negative connotation for 
the local population. «The only interpretation of the constant interventions in our 
country is that nobody is interested in really finding a solution to the Somali problem» 
(Issa 2012 [interview]). The lack of transparency fuels the locals’ suspicion further, 
leading to rumors claiming that private security actors are involved in manufacturing 
illegal drugs and are responsible for dumping toxic waste both in the ocean and 
onshore in Somalia. These rumors are again being used as propaganda by al-Shabab to 
convince the Somali people that foreigners are there to take over the land (Ashereh 
2112 [interview]; Economist 2012 [interview]). 
 
6.3 Building or crowding out state institutions? 
Some of the inhabitants of Mogadishu are concerned that the presence of private 
security actors prevents the state from establishing a monopoly on the use of force. 
Bashir Issa, who is now retired but formerly served as Deputy Governor of the Central 
Bank of Somalia, claims that foreign PMSCs are undermining the function of the 
government and its institutions: «You will never have real institutions if others are 
doing the job» (Issa 2012 [interview]). According to Holmqvist the use of PMSCs in 
support of multilateral peace missions and aid agency operations can offer some 
promise for weak states, as long as great caution and sensitivity is secured, formalized 
under regulatory structures. But if external actors are increasingly taking on functions 
conventionally reserved for state institutions it may be seen to represent a dictated 
choice (Homlqvist 2005:55). And by some of the interviewees international PMSCs 
are seen as tools to dictate Somalia. Instead of using foreign forces in the attempt to 
stabilize Somalia, international security advisors should be hired to give training to 
local forces, according to the interviewees, who see foreign involvement as positive if 
it exclusively involves security advisors who are hired to build capacities and give 
training (Ashereh 2012 [interview]; Mohamed 2012 [interview]).  
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[U]sing PSCs engaged by an external actor risks further marginalizing the host 
(weak) state, because placing the source of legitimacy and of delivery in 
outsiders’ hands distances the state from the normal system of national and 
international security governance (Holmqvist 2005:21) 
 
Bashir Issa interprets the PMSC presence as a duplication of functions that 
should be performed by Somali institutions, and believes they are imposed by foreign 
governments with the aim of replacing functions within the Somali security sector 
(2012 [interview]). Others are concerned about what might happen if PMSCs get too 
involved in the political process (Economist 2012 [interview]). TFG sources state that 
the government is not concerned about current PMSC activity in south-central 
Somalia, but acknowledge that private security actors can pose a threat if they get too 
numerous and powerful (TFG source no.1 2012 [interview]; TFG source no.2 
[interview]). According to one official in the TFG it is vital to consider the situation 
Somalia is in when discussing security assistance from outside actors: «When you do 
not have choice you say yes to all the help you can get in order to stabilize the 
situation» (TFG source no.1 [interview]). A PMSC can in some cases obtain 
information that it will benefit from if the principal is not informed. Singer states that 
there will always be a clear tension between the security goals of clients and the 
companies’ desire for profit maximization (2008:151). This indicates a danger that the 
companies contracted, or financed, by state actors neglect foreign policy principles in 
their efforts to enhance their income. According to Avant a state can be able to 
conduct its foreign policy by proxy when it is confident that PMSCs will act as agreed. 
This way the state can pursue its interests abroad without sending its own troops 
(Avant 2005:68). 
Foreign actors and international organizations are not the only ones contracting 
PMSCS – as mentioned previously political entities within Somalia have also hired 
private contractors. A TFG source believes the south-central government will contract 
PMSCs to a larger degree the next few years, but only in providing logistics and 
advice, and not as armed forces (TFG source no.2 2012 [interview]). Financial 
constraints on state resources make the option of hiring private security services 
attractive to many weak states, according to Holmqvist because it offers a quick fix to 
security, «but the way in which it tends to crowd out the public security apparatus 
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means that extensive reliance on PSCs in the longer term weakens state authority» 
(2005:12). She claims that in cases where a weak state itself contracts a PMSC, it does 
so on basis of getting immediate results, rather than fundamentally restructuring 
standing armies or police forces, rooting out corruption, and ensuring the efficiency 
and loyalty of public forces, «with PSCs effectively colluding in the establishment and 
maintenance of a system of security for the few at the expense of the many» (ibid:21) 
But PMSCs may strengthen a state if they contribute to ensure stability and 
security (O'Brien 1998). Sam Mattock insists security is the bedrock of society and 
claims that PMSCs are nothing but an asset to stakeholders and will offer peace and 
prosperity to the Somalis (Mattock 2012 [interview]). The exceptional situation 
Somalia is in taken into consideration, a UN source confirms that PMSCs are at the 
moment essential because one cannot rely on state security institutions. While in a 
longer perspective it is important to establish a legal framework within which the 
PMSCs are regulated, the source insists that most private actors hired by actors of the 
international community is currently an asset to stabilizing the country and has so far 
not been a hindrance for Somali institutions to build their capacities (UN source no.1 
[interview]). 
 
 
6.4 Summary 
Based on the information gained from interviews there is reason to believe that the 
presence of foreign PMSCs, particularly in Mogadishu, is of great concern among 
Somalis. There is a general recognition of the necessity of armed security, but non-
Somali actors are claimed to have too little knowledge about Somali society (Ashereh 
2012 [interview]). Some of the disapproval of foreign PMSCs can be accounted to 
Somalia’s history of being subject to unsuccessful international intervention, leaving 
the local population with a negative impression of outside actors’ intentions (Issa 2012 
[interview]). A lack of transparency and openness from PMSCs increases the 
suspicions further, leading to rumors about the companies’ objectives (Ashereh 2012 
[interview]; Economist 2012 [interview]). 
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PMSCs are by some perceived as either duplications of functions Somali 
institutions should perform or as dictating the security sector institutions and 
preventing the state from establishing the monopoly on the legitimate use of force that 
it ideally should have. Foreign security actors are, however, perceived as positive as 
long as they provide training and advice and do not participate in actual security 
provision (Issa 2012 [interview]; Ashereh 2012 [interview]; Economist 2012 
[interview]). 
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Chapter seven: Concluding remarks 
 
7.1 PMSCs impact on security sector institutions  
The state of Somalia does not fulfill its core task by Max Weber’s definition, as it does 
not maintain an exclusive «legitimate use of physical force» (1964:154). Due to the 
state’s condition it can be defined as a quasi-state, or even a failed state. But Coyne 
and Leeson (2010) claim that resorting to the concept of a failed state is dangerously 
limiting; one should instead focus on what institutions are viable and what they can 
accomplish. Nonetheless, it is argued that when PMSCs get involved in weak states 
they can threaten the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (Hansen 
200:585; Østerud 2005:103). But this thesis has maintained that in Somalia the issue 
of the state’s monopoly of violence is a question of the monopoly the state ideally 
should have, rather than it’s actual power. With respect to PMSCs it can be seen as a 
matter of to what extent private contractors can assist in establishing such a monopoly 
by enabling security sector institution building. 
«Private military actors thrive in areas of weak governance» (Singer 2008:38). 
That is the case in Somalia as well, but the role of PMSCs should be studied with a 
broader perspective, because not all private contractors seeking profit have succeeded. 
International interventions were a golden opportunity for PMSCs to play profitable 
support roles during the early 1990s, and again starting from the AMISOM 
intervention in 2007. Although no certain conclusions can be drawn, based on the 
examples given in the analysis it seems to be a tendency that PMSCs associated with 
the liberal peace paradigm are more likely to experience operational success over time 
than PMSCs perceived to be operating outside liberal interventionism. Generalizing is 
difficult, but it appears that PMSCs working within the wide framework of a liberal 
peace agenda are seen to have more legitimate interests (UN source no.1 [interview]). 
SCS/Saracen, a mix between a «military provider firm» and a «military consulting 
firm», assisted the Puntland administration in building an extensive force that could 
potentially assist in stabilizing the region. But the company operated with a lack of 
transparency, independently of all international, multilateral frameworks for support to 
the Somali security sector, and consequently its operations became the object of 
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suspicion, to some degree increasing political rivalry and instability instead of 
contributing positively to Somali security sector institutions (UN source no.1 2012 
[interview]; UN Security Council 2011:282; New York Times 2012; Cross 2012 
[interview]). 
Different types of PMSCs will impact institution in different ways. NCM, a 
non-lethal advising PMSC, plays an important part in developing a security system for 
the Berbera port, ensuring that international standards are met. The project, funded 
entirely by development aid, is important for Somaliland financially, and can be said 
to assist institution building in the region (Hansen 2008:596). However, it is not 
certain that the same type of PMSC would be successful in south-central Somalia, 
given that the situation there is much more volatile. In Mogadishu Bancroft provides 
military training to the AMISOM forces. The company is seen as an important 
contributor to the relative success AMISOM has had in ensuring stability, and its main 
contribution to the Somali security sector is developing the skills of the African Union 
soldiers and the TFG forces. However, it is claimed that Bancroft has also played a 
part in policy development directly with the TFG (UN source no.2 2012 [interview]; 
Cross 2012 [interview]). This study does not have sufficient information to assess 
what impact the policymaking aid has on Somali security institutions. 
 
 
7.2 Areas for further research 
Hopefully this thesis can be a foundation for future research. The matter of PMSCs 
being directly involved in policymaking is one of the areas that deserve further 
investigation. Although the term PMSC has here been used to denote every type of 
private military and security company it does not mean that one should always apply 
the same yardstick to all private security actors. There is, for instance, a significant 
difference between NCM and SCS/Saracen. In this thesis certain types of local militias 
are also included in the discussion. The possible transition some militias are going 
through, perhaps becoming legitimate and regulated security outfits, is also an area 
that justifies attention and further study. Further work is necessary, as PMSCs will 
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continue to play an important part in Somalia while the fragile country emerges 
towards stability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 56 
References 
 
 Abrahamsen, Rita and Michael C. Williams (2011): Security Beyond the State: 
Private Security in International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press  
 AECOM (2012): «Projects in support for the AFRICAP program», URL 
http://www.africapcentral.com/projects.aspx, [20.08. 2012]  
 Avant, Deborah (2005): The Market for Force. Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univeristy Press 
 Barnett, Michael (2006): «Building a Republican peace – Stabilizing States 
after War» URL 
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2006.30.4.87, [24.02. 
2012] 
 Bennis, Warren, Daniel Goleman and Patricia Ward Bierdman (2008): 
«Creating a Culture of Candor», Chapter one in Warren Bennis, Daniel 
Goleman and James O’Toole (Eds.): Transparency – How leaders Create a 
Culture of Candor, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass: 1-44 
 Bowden, Mark (1999): Black Hawk Down. Kent: Bantam Press 
 Coker, Christopher (2002): Waging War Without Warriors.  Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers 
 Coyne, Cristopher J. & Peter T. Leeson (2010): «Somalia: Understanding the 
Feasible Institutions», URL: http://www.ccoyne.com/Somalia.pdf, [07.01. 
2012] 
 Creswell, John (2003): Research Design – Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed 
Methods Approaches, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications 
 Denscombe, Martyn (2010): Ground Rules for Social Research – Guidelines for 
Good Practice, Berkshire: Open University Press 
 Doyle, Michael (1997): Ways of War and Peace, New York: W.W. Norton 
 Forbes (2007): «US: DynCorp Hired for Somalia Peacekeeping», 07.03. 2007, 
URL: http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=14398, [09.12. 2012] 
 Fund for Peace (2012): «Failed States Index», URL: 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi, [26.08. 2012] 
 Hansen, Stig Jarle (2008): «Private Security & Local Politics in Somalia», 
Review of African Political Economy, 35:188, 585-598, URL: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056240802569268, [21.12. 
2011] 
 Hegre, Håvard (2005): «Development and the Liberal Peace», in Nordic 
Journal of Political Economy 31: 17-46 
 Hellevik, Ottar (1999): Forskningsmetode i sosiologi og statsvitenskap, Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget 
 Holmqvist, Caroline (2005): «Private Security Companies – The Case of 
Regulation», Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI policy 
Paper N0. 9, URL: http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP09.pdf, [14.02. 2012] 
 Houston Chronicle (1992): «Brown & Root unit to help Somalia force», 17.12. 
 57 
1992, URL: 
http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl/1992_1100015/brown-amp-
root-unit-to-help-somalia-force.html [12.02. 2012] 
 Howard, Michael (1976):  War in European History. Norwich: Oxford 
University Press 
 Hull, Cecilia & Emma Svensson (2008): «African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM – Exemplifying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges», URL 
http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir2596.pdf, [06.04. 2012] 
 Human Rights First (2012): «Nisoor Square Anniversary Reminder of Need to 
Close Accountability Gap», URL: 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2012/09/14/nisoor-square-anniversary-
reminder-of-need-to-close-accountability-gap/, [20.09. 2012] 
 Independent Online News (2012): «Private firm flouts UN embargo in 
Somalia», 26.02. 2012, URL: http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/private-firm-
flouts-un-embargo-in-somalia-1.1242748#.UI-2-WknCMa, [03.06 2012] 
 ICRC (2009): «The Montreux document: On pertinent international legal 
obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private 
military and security companies during armed conflict», URL: 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf, [02.04. 2012] 
 Jackson, Robert (1990): «States and Quasi-States» Chapter one in Quasi-States, 
Sovreignty, International Relations, and the Third World, Cambridge 
University Press: 13-49 
 Kinsey, Christopher (2006): Corporate Soldiers and International Security – 
The rise of private military companies. New York: Routledge 
 Krahmann, Elke (2002): «Private Firms and the New Security Governance», 
URL: http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/krahmann.html, [15.12. 2011]. 
 Krahmann, Elke (2009): «Private Security Companies and the State Monopoly 
on Violence: A Case of Norm Change?», URL 
http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2729/pdf/prif88_01.pdf, [26.03. 
2012] 
 Krahmann, Elke (2010): States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 Le Monde diplomatique (2010):  «Somaliland, an African exception», 6.10. 
2010, URL: http://mondediplo.com/2010/10/06somaliland, [18.01. 2011] 
 Lock, Peter (1999): «Africa, military downsizing and the growth in the security 
industry», Chapter two in Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (Eds.): Peace, Profit 
or Plunder? The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies, 
Halfway House: Institute for Security Studies: 11-36 
 Mac Ginty, Roger (2010): «Warlords and the liberal peace: State-building in 
Afghanistan», URL: 
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CSD_WarlordsandtheLiber
alPeace.pdf, [24.02. 2012] 
 Malan, Mark (1999): «The crisis in external response», Chapter three in Jakkie 
Cilliers and Peggy Mason (Eds.): Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatisation 
of Security in War-Torn African Societies, Halfway House: Institute for 
 58 
Security Studies: 37-60 
 Marshall, Catherine & Rossman, Gretchen B. (1999): Designing Qualitative 
Research, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications 
 Matlary, Janne Haaland & Østerud, Øyvind (2005): «Mot et avnasjonalisert 
forsvar?», Chapter one in Janne Haaland Matlary and Øyvind Østerud (Eds.): 
Mot et avnasjonalisert forsvar?, Oslo: Abstrakt forlag AS 
 Menkhaus, Ken (2004): Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism. 
New York: Oxford University Press 
 New York Times (2011): «U.S. Relies on Contractors in Somalia Conflict», 
10.08. 2012, URL: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/11/world/africa/11somalia.html?pagewanted
=1&_r=2&, [20.08. 2011] 
 New York Times (2012): «Somali Army Formed to Fight Somali Pirates 
Leaves Troubled Legacy», 04.10. 2012, URL 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/world/africa/private-army-leaves-
troubled-legacy-in-somalia.html?pagewanted=1&ref=somalia, [15.10. 2012] 
 North, Douglass (1990): Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance, New York: Cambridge University Press 
 O'Brien, Kevin (1998): "Military-Advisory Groups and African Security: 
Privatised Peacekeeping?", International Peacekeeping, autumn 1998: 78-105, 
URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13533319808413732, 
[21.12. 2011] 
 Rasch, Bjørn Erik (2000): Demokrati – Ideer og organisering, Bergen: 
Fagbokforlaget 
 Rubin, Herbert J & Irene S. Rubin (1995): Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of 
Hearing Data. London: Sage Publications Thousand Oaks 
 Singer, Peter Warren (2008): Corporate Warriors – the rise of the privatized 
military industry. Itahaca: Cornell University Press 
 Somalia Report (2011): «Contractor’s Paradise – Part One», 10.09. 2011, URL: 
http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1548, [14.04. 2012] 
 Somaliland Press (2012): «Saracen International bolts out of Puntland region», 
URL: http://somalilandpress.com/saracen-international-bolts-out-of-puntland-
region-27742, [20.08. 2012] 
 Stinnett, Nathaniel (2005): «Regulating the privatization of war: How to stop 
private military firms from committing human rights abuses», 28 B.C. Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 211, URL: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol28/iss1/8/, 
[28.03. 2012] 
 UN Security Council (1992): «Resolution 733 (1992)», URL: 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/733(1992), [01.06. 
2012] 
 UN Security Council (2006): «Resolution 1725 (2006)», URL: 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1725(2006), [01.06. 
2012] 
 UN Security Council (2007): «Resoulution 1744 (2007)», URL: 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1744(2007), [01.06. 
 59 
2012] 
 UN Security Council (2010): «Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia 
pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853 (2008)», URL: 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/91, [24.03. 2012] 
 UN Security Council (2011): «Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and 
Eritrea pursuant Security Council resolution 1916 (2010)», URL: 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/AC.29/2011/1, [24.03. 
2012] 
 UN Security Council (2012): «Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and 
Eritrea pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2002 (2011)», URL: 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/544, [24.03. 2012] 
 Weber, Max (1964): The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 
London: The Free Press of Glencoe Collier-Macmillan Limited. 
 Yin, Robert K. (1994): «Analyzing Case Study Evidence», Chapter five in Case 
Study Research – Design and Methods, London: Sage Publications: 102-125 
 Yin, Robert K (2009): «Introduction: How to Know Whether an When to Use 
Case Studies as a Research Method» and «Designing Case Studies: Identifying 
Your Case(s) and Establishing the Logic of Your Case Study», Chapter one and 
two in Case Study Research – Design and Methods, Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications: 3-60 
 Østensen, Åse Gilje (2011): «UN Use of Private Military and Security 
Companies – Practices and Policies», The Geneva Center for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces. SSR Paper 3 
 Østerud, Øyvind (2005): «Militærmakt på markedet», Chap. three in Janne 
Haaland Matlary & Øyvind Østerud (Eds.): Mot et avnasjonalisert forsvar?, 
Oslo: Abstrakt forlag AS: 78-106 
 
 
Interviews: 
 
 Ashereh, Hon Awad Ahmed, Member of Parliament, Chairman of 
Parliamentary Committee for Information, Culture and Heritage, Nairobi, 
29.04. 2012 
 Cross, Peter, Civilian Police Project Manager in the United Nations 
Development Program, Nairobi, 03.05. 2012 
 Economist, Returned to Mogadishu after years in exile in Canada, Nairobi, 
29.04. 2012 
 Farah, Jimaale M., Operations Director, Physical Risk Solutions, Hargeisa, 
07.05. 2012 
 Francke, Herbert, CEO, Nordic Crisis Management, Oslo, 30.03. 2012 
 Issa, Bashir, Retired, Former Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Somalia, 
Nairobi, 01.05. 2012 
 Mattock, Sam, Chief Executive Officer of Halliday Finch, Nairobi, 15.05. 2012 
 Maye, Sharif Shekuna, Police Commissioner of Mogadishu, Nairobi, 29.04. 
2012 
 60 
 Mohamed, Zakaria, Lawyer and inhabitant of Mogadishu, Nairobi, 30.04. 2012 
 Omer Mohamed, Ali, Port Manager Berbera Port, Berbera, 09.05. 2012 
 TFG source no. 1, Oslo, 13.04. 2012 
 TFG source no. 2, Nairobi, 28.04. 2012 
 UN source no. 1, Nairobi, 14.05. 2012 
 UN source no. 2, Nairobi, 03.05. 2012 
